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Enforcing Inbound Forum Selection Clauses
in State Court
John Coyle* & Katherine C. Richardson **
ABSTRACT
A forum selection clause is a contractual provision that selects a court for
future disputes. Such clauses serve two primary functions. First, they may be
used to redirect litigation from one state to another (an “outbound” clause).
Second, they may be used to extend the personal jurisdiction of the chosen
court over the contracting parties (an “inbound” clause). To date, scholars
have focused most of their attention on the redirecting function played by
outbound clauses. In this Article, we provide a definitive account of the role
played by inbound clauses as means of obtaining personal jurisdiction over
out-of-state defendants.
This account is based on our review of 283 published and unpublished
state court cases where the defendant challenged the enforceability of an
inbound forum selection clause. We show that state courts currently enforce
inbound clauses in the overwhelming majority of cases. They enforce them in
consumer contracts of adhesion. They enforce them where the identity of the
chosen jurisdiction is not clearly spelled out. And they enforce them when the
chosen forum is extremely inconvenient. The end result is a legal regime
where distant courts routinely assert personal jurisdiction over weaker
contracting parties on the basis of inbound forum selection clauses.
This state of affairs is inequitable and unjust. To remedy the situation, this
Article advances several proposals to reform the existing law in this area.
First, we argue that courts should not enforce inbound clauses against
unsophisticated actors in contracts of adhesion. Second, we argue that courts
should not enforce these clauses when there is no way for the defendant to
identify the chosen jurisdiction at the time of signing. Lastly, we argue that
*
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courts should not enforce these clauses when the chosen court is not in a
reasonably convenient location.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2019, the home page for Google’s search engine received more than
258 million unique U.S. visitors.1 Each of these visits was governed by
Google’s terms of service, which contain the following language:
California law will govern all disputes arising out of or relating to
these terms, service-specific additional terms, or any related
services, regardless of conflict of laws rules. These disputes will be
resolved exclusively in the federal or state courts of Santa Clara
County, California, USA, and you and Google consent to personal
jurisdiction in those courts. 2

The italicized forum selection clause works to Google’s benefit when it is
named as a defendant in a lawsuit. If one of the many visitors to Google’s
website wishes to sue the company, she must do so in Santa Clara County. If
she tries to bring a suit somewhere else—in Arizona, for example, or Texas—
Google may invoke the clause to request that the case be moved to Santa
Clara County. In the overwhelming majority of cases, this request will be
1.
J. Clement, Google—Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://www.statista.com/topics/1001/google/ [https://perma.cc/64XF-LGQY]. The total
population of the United States is roughly 330 million. QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219
[https://perma.cc/92E6-RNEU]
(July 1, 2019).
2.
Terms of Service, GOOGLE (emphasis added), https://policies.google.com/terms?hl=enUS [https://perma.cc/F9DG-JF9W].
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granted. 3 When Google is the defendant in a lawsuit, the clause serves as a
sort of jurisdictional funnel that redirects lawsuits filed across the United
States to a court located just ten miles from Google’s headquarters.
What happens, however, when Google wishes to sue one of its 258 million
visitors for violating the terms of service? Must it bring an action against that
person in a state where she resides? Or may it sue her in Santa Clara County?
The text of the forum selection clause—“you . . . consent to personal
jurisdiction in those courts”—clearly suggests the latter. 4 When Google is the
plaintiff in a lawsuit, therefore, the clause acts as a jurisdictional lasso that
allows California to assert personal jurisdiction over the company’s
customers. If the clause is valid, then Google can wield this language buried
in its terms of service, of which few of its users are aware, to subject its
hundreds of millions of visitors to jurisdiction in Santa Clara County.
State courts are routinely called upon to determine the validity of
consent-to-jurisdiction clauses such as the one above. Their general practice
is to enforce these clauses. They enforce them in consumer contracts of
adhesion. 5 They enforce them when the clause fails to provide the defendant
with notice of where, exactly, she is consenting to personal jurisdiction. 6
They enforce them when the chosen forum is extremely inconvenient. 7 They
sometimes even enforce them—remarkably—against individuals who never
signed the contract containing the clause. 8 The end result is a legal regime
where distant courts assert personal jurisdiction over weaker contracting
parties on the basis of forum selection clauses.
To date, legal scholars have written extensively—and often critically—
about the role that forum selection clauses play in redirecting cases from one
state to another. 9 The role that such clauses play in permitting a state to keep
3.
See John F. Coyle & Katherine C. Richardson, Enforcing Outbound Forum Selection
Clauses in State Court, 96 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 5),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=3546669 [https://perma.cc/9THR-TM2D]
(showing that the enforcement rate for outbound forum selection clauses in state court is 77%).
4.
Terms of Service, supra note 2.
5.
See, e.g., Adsit Co. v. Gustin, 874 N.E.2d 1018, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
6.
See, e.g., Dynacorp Ltd. v. Aramtel Ltd., 56 A.3d 631, 678–79 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2012).
7.
See, e.g., Carlyle Inv. Mgmt. L.L.C. v. Nat’l Indus. Grp. Holding, No. 5527-CS, 2012
Del. Ch. LEXIS 238, at *22–23 (Oct. 11, 2012), aff’d, 67 A.3d 373 (Del. 2013).
8.
See, e.g., Solargenix Energy, LLC v. Acciona, S.A., 2014 IL App (1st) 123403, ¶¶ 51–
52, 17 N.E.3d 171, 188–89; see also John F. Coyle & Robin J. Effron, Forum Selection Clauses,
Non-Signatories, and Personal Jurisdiction, 97 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
9.
See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers,
Forum-Selection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 423, 445–49 (1992); Linda
S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual
Personal Jurisdiction, 27 TEX. INT’L L.J. 323, 370 (1992); Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection
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a case by asserting personal jurisdiction over a defendant has received
comparatively less attention. 10 This inattention is troubling for three reasons.
First, forum selection clauses are becoming ever more common in U.S.
contracts. 11 A recent study of more than 500,000 contracts filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission between 2000 and 2016 found that
30% of these agreements contained forum selection clauses. 12 This same
study found that 53% of loan agreements contained such clauses. 13 As one
scholar has observed: “The forum selection clause . . . is among the most
important and pervasive types of contract procedure.” 14 Nevertheless, there
is scant empirical information about the extent to which such clauses are used
to extend the personal jurisdiction of the chosen court over the contracting
parties.
Agreements in the Federal Courts After Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional Reform,
67 WASH. L. REV. 55, 60 (1992); Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and
Economics of Choice of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 700,
711–14 (1992).
10. The leading articles discussing the role of forum selection clauses as a means of
obtaining personal jurisdiction over a defendant are Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Interpretation and
Effect of Permissive Forum Selection Clauses Under U.S. Law, 66 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 127 passim
(2018); Walter W. Heiser, Forum Selection Clauses in State Courts: Limitations on Enforcement
After Stewart and Carnival Cruise, 45 FLA. L. REV. 361, 369–71 (1993); Walter W. Heiser, The
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: The Impact on Forum Non Conveniens,
Transfer of Venue, Removal, and Recognition of Judgments in United States Courts, 31 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 1013, 1019 (2010); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of
Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 329–32
(1988); David H. Taylor, The Forum Selection Clause: A Tale of Two Concepts, 66 TEMP. L. REV.
785 passim (1993). Several legal treatises also discuss this topic at varying levels of depth. See
ALEX MILLS, PARTY AUTONOMY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 114–17 (2018); GARY B. BORN
& PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 115–16
(5th ed. 2011); PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 367–69 (6th ed. 2018).
11. When we use the term “forum selection clause” in this Article, we refer exclusively to
contractual provisions that select a court as a place to resolve disputes. We specifically do not
address the enforceability of arbitration clauses. Unlike a forum selection clause, an arbitration
clause selects an arbitral forum as a place to resolve disputes.
12. Julian Nyarko, We’ll See You in . . . Court! The Lack of Arbitration Clauses in
International Commercial Contracts, 58 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 6, 11 (2018).
13. Id. at 11 tbl.2; see also Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Delaware’s
Competitive Reach, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 92, 94 (2012) (finding that 60% of the merger
agreements in the sample contained forum selection clauses with Delaware as their choice of
forum); Ya-Wei Li, Note, Dispute Resolution Clauses in International Contracts: An Empirical
Study, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 789, 797–99 (2006) (finding that 67% of “merger, acquisition, stock
exchange and share exchange, reorganization, and combination contracts filed with the [SEC]
between January 1, 2002 and March 31, 2003 and involving at least one foreign party” contained
a forum selection clause).
14. David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection
Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 973, 975 (2008); see also Taylor, supra note 10,
at 793 n.38.
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Second, the U.S. Supreme Court has over the past decade embarked on a
sustained campaign to remake the law of personal jurisdiction. In Daimler
and BNSF Railway, the Court made it more difficult for plaintiffs to obtain
general, all-purpose jurisdiction over corporate defendants. 15 In Bristol Myers
Squibb, the Court made it more difficult for plaintiffs to obtain specific,
case-linked jurisdiction over the same. 16 As a result of these doctrinal shifts,
obtaining jurisdiction by express consent via a forum selection clause
represents an increasingly attractive means of bringing suit against
out-of-state defendants. 17
Third, and finally, the law on jurisdiction by express consent is messy, at
best. Courts in New York apply the test laid down by the Supreme Court in
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. to determine whether a
consent-to-jurisdiction clause is enforceable. 18 Courts in Florida look to that
state’s long-arm statute. 19 Courts in Michigan look to the Model Choice of
Forum Act. 20 Courts in Maine look to the minimum contacts framework
announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in International Shoe. 21 Courts in Utah
apply a rational nexus test. 22 To further complicate matters, some states have
enacted statutes directing their courts to enforce such clauses when written
into certain contracts. 23 Other states have enacted statutes directing their
courts not to enforce such clauses when they are written into certain other
contracts. 24 The sheer diversity of state practice makes it difficult to
understand what is really going on. It also serves to obscure a number of
doctrinal problems.
Our first goal in this Article is to provide a long overdue descriptive
account of when forum selection clauses may provide a valid basis for
asserting personal jurisdiction over a defendant in state court. In developing
this account, we distinguish between (1) forum selection clauses that are used
to redirect litigation from one state to another (an “outbound” clause), and
15. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138–39 (2014); BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell,
137 S. Ct. 1549, 1559 (2017).
16. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017).
17. Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, A New State Registration
Act: Legislating a Longer Arm for Personal Jurisdiction, 57 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 377, 436–37
(2020) (observing that “plaintiffs confront insurmountable obstacles in some situations in finding
an effective forum to vindicate their rights” in the wake of Supreme Court cases cutting back on
general jurisdiction).
18. See infra Part III.A.1.
19. See infra Part III.A.4.
20. See infra Part III.A.3.
21. See infra Part III.A.5.
22. See infra Part III.A.6.
23. See infra Part III.B.1.
24. See infra Part III.B.2.
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(2) forum selection clauses that extend the personal jurisdiction of the chosen
court over the contracting parties (an “inbound” clause). We call the first type
of clauses “outbound” forum selection clauses because they dictate that the
case must be heard in a state other than the one where suit was filed. We call
the second type of clauses “inbound” forum selection clauses because they
select the state where the suit is filed. It is the second type—inbound
clauses—that is the sole focus of this Article. 25
With this focus in mind, we begin with a detailed overview of the law of
inbound clauses as currently applied in state courts. We show that the
Supreme Court has determined that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes virtually no restrictions on the ability of state courts to
enforce such clauses. Nor have most states significantly limited enforcement
under state law. The majority of states apply the test laid down by the U.S.
Supreme Court in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. to determine whether
an inbound clause provides a proper basis for the assertion of personal
jurisdiction. 26 We show that states utilize no fewer than seven different
methods for determining when inbound clauses may support the exercise of
personal jurisdiction. We also show that all fifty state legislatures have
enacted statutes that identify specific situations when inbound clauses should
and should not be enforced.
After canvassing the law on the books, we turn our attention to the law in
action. Drawing upon a hand-collected dataset of 283 published and
unpublished state cases that address the enforceability of inbound clauses, we
offer the first empirical account of what state courts actually do when called
upon to give effect to these provisions. 27 Our data show that the overall
enforcement rate for inbound clauses in state court is 80%. 28 The data suggest
that regardless of the doctrinal approach a state utilizes to evaluate the
enforceability of inbound clauses, in practice states refuse to enforce them for
just a handful of predictable reasons.
We finally turn our attention to the normative project of reforming the law
in this area. First, we argue that inbound clauses written into contracts of
25. We discuss outbound clauses in other work. See Coyle & Richardson, supra note 3.
26. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
27. The process by which we collected these cases is described in infra Part IV.A. In brief,
our dataset of 283 cases consists of every published and unpublished state case in the last fifty
years when a court was called upon to determine the enforceability of an inbound forum selection
clause. We identified these cases by reviewing every state case in the Lexis Advance database
that contained the term “choice of court clause” or “forum selection clause” or “choice of forum
clause” or “consent to jurisdiction clause” or “venue selection clause.”
28. This rate is slightly higher than the enforcement rate for outbound clauses. In other work,
we showed that the overall enforcement rate for outbound clauses is 77%. See generally Coyle &
Richardson, supra note 3.
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adhesion should not be enforced against consumers, employees, or very small
businesses. If Google were to try to sue one of its typical users in Santa Clara
County court, for example, we argue that the forum selection clause in its
terms of service should not be enforced. Second, we argue that the primary
purpose of a forum selection clause is to provide certainty as to where
disputes arising out of the transaction may be litigated. Accordingly, we
argue that an inbound clause should not be enforced if the identity of the
chosen jurisdiction was not clear to the defendant at the time the contract was
executed. Third, we argue for a comprehensive overhaul of the way that
courts address the topic of “inconvenience” in the context of an inquiry as to
whether to enforce an inbound clause.
The Article concludes by discussing how state implementation of the
reforms listed above would affect the federal courts. We show that any
reforms relating to jurisdiction by express consent enacted by a state will
necessarily alter the jurisdictional reach of federal district courts sitting in
diversity. This is because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k) provides that
a federal district court may only assert personal jurisdiction over defendants
who are “subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the
state where the district court is located.” 29 If a state were to adopt a new test
for determining the validity of an inbound forum selection clause, the federal
district courts sitting in that state would be obliged to follow suit in diversity
cases. This fact notwithstanding, a number of federal courts currently
disregard state law in determining whether a forum selection clause provides
a valid basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction. We show that this error
stems from a failure to appreciate the difference between inbound and
outbound forum selection clauses. Under existing Supreme Court precedent,
the enforceability of an outbound clause in a diversity action is a question of
federal law because it arises in the context of a motion to transfer under
28 U.S.C. § 1404 or a motion to dismiss on the basis of the federal doctrine
of forum non conveniens. The enforceability of an inbound clause in a
diversity action, by contrast, is a question that must be answered by reference
to state law by operation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k). The fact
that federal courts routinely fail to appreciate this fact highlights the pressing
need for more scholarship that clearly distinguishes between inbound and
outbound forum selection clauses.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the differences between
inbound and outbound clauses. Part II discusses the (virtually nonexistent)
limits on consent jurisdiction imposed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Part III surveys the law relating to the enforcement
29.

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
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of inbound clauses as it appears on the books. Part IV explores how this law
is applied in practice. Part V lays out several reforms that, if enacted, would
result in a much-improved law of jurisdiction by express consent. Part VI
discusses the implications of this analysis for federal practice.
I.

INBOUND AND OUTBOUND CLAUSES

Since there is very little in the existing literature that explains the
distinction between an “inbound” and an “outbound” forum selection clause,
we begin our discussion with a brief explanation of these terms. 30
An inbound forum selection clause is a contractual provision whereby the
parties agree to litigate in the court where the suit was filed. 31 Inbound clauses
are also known as “consent-to-jurisdiction” clauses. 32 By way of example,
imagine a scenario where the parties have agreed that any disputes arising out
of their contract may be litigated in the state courts of California. One party
files a lawsuit against the other in California state court. The defendant moves
to dismiss the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. In this context, the forum
selection clause functions as an inbound clause because it stipulates that
litigation may occur in a forum (California) where the suit has been filed
(California). An inbound clause may provide the basis for the court’s

30. See Salesforce.com, Inc. v. GEA, Inc., No. 19-CV-01710-JST, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
136745, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2019) (invoking the distinction).
31. Id.
32. Other scholars have relied on the outbound/inbound terminology to explain the
mechanics of forum selection clauses. See, e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the
American Courts in 2018: Thirty-Second Annual Survey, 67 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 1, 37–44 (2019)
(utilizing the outbound/inbound distinction); Carolyn Dubay, From Forum Non Conveniens to
Open Forum: Implementing the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements in the United
States, 3 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 1, 27–28 (2011) (distinguishing between forum selection
clauses that redirect cases from one jurisdiction to another and forum selection clauses that
provide a basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction). In Europe, scholars frequently draw a
distinction between “prorogation” and “derogation” clauses. See MILLS, supra note 10, at 113–
28; James T. Gilbert, Choice of Forum Clauses in International and Interstate Contracts, 65 KY.
L.J. 1, 5 (1976); Taylor, supra note 10, at 791–92. We utilize the outbound/inbound language for
two reasons. First, it is more commonly used by courts in the United States. See, e.g., Burke v.
Goodman, 114 S.W.3d 276, 279 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (“An inbound forum selection clause
provides for trial inside Missouri. An outbound forum selection clause provides for trial outside
Missouri.” (citation omitted)); Ex parte Riverfront, LLC, 129 So. 3d 1008, 1011 n.2 (Ala. 2013)
(“An ‘outbound’ forum selection clause is one providing for trial outside of Alabama, while an
‘inbound’ clause provides for trial inside Alabama.” (quoting Pro. Ins. Corp. v. Sutherland, 700
So. 2d 347, 348 n.1 (Ala. 1997)). Second, it maps neatly onto the actual operation of the clauses
and makes it easier for the uninitiated to distinguish one from the other.
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assertion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant with no other connection
to the chosen forum. This is known as jurisdiction by express consent. 33
An outbound forum selection clause, by contrast, is a contractual provision
stipulating that any litigation between the parties must occur in a forum other
than the one in which the suit was filed. 34 By way of example, imagine a
scenario where the parties have agreed that any and all disputes relating to
their contract must be litigated in California. This agreement
notwithstanding, one party files a lawsuit against the other in Texas state
court. The defendant asks the Texas court to enforce the forum selection
clause and dismiss the case because it should have been brought in California.
In this context, the forum selection clause functions as an outbound clause
because it stipulates that litigation must occur in a forum (California) other
than the one in which the suit was filed (Texas). To be clear, the outbound
clause does not deprive the Texas court of jurisdiction to hear the case. 35 It
merely provides the Texas court with a reason to refrain from exercising that
jurisdiction because the parties have previously agreed that the dispute must
be resolved elsewhere.
It is impossible to know whether a particular contract provision functions
as an outbound clause or an inbound clause merely by looking at the language
in the clause. 36 The distinction only manifests after a lawsuit is filed. This
means that the exact same contract provision may operate as an outbound
33. See Richard A. Epstein, Consent, Not Power, as the Basis of Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 1, 4.
34. Salesforce.com, Inc., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136745, at *14.
35. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972) (“The argument that such
clauses are improper because they tend to ‘oust’ a court of jurisdiction is hardly more than a
vestigial legal fiction. It appears to rest at core on historical judicial resistance to any attempt to
reduce the power and business of a particular court and has little place in an era when all courts
are overloaded and when businesses once essentially local now operate in world markets.”).
36. Courts and scholars often draw a distinction between “exclusive” or “mandatory” forum
selection clauses and “nonexclusive” or “permissive” forum selection clauses. See, e.g.,
Buxbaum, supra note 10, at 135–36. This distinction is one that is based on the language in the
clause itself. An exclusive clause by its terms provides that litigation must proceed in the chosen
forum and nowhere else. Id. at 129. A nonexclusive clause by its terms provides that the parties
consent to jurisdiction and/or venue in the chosen forum but does not preclude a suit from being
brought elsewhere. Id. at 135–36. The distinction between exclusive and nonexclusive clauses is
relevant to the distinction between outbound and inbound clauses because only exclusive clauses
may qualify as outbound clauses. If a clause requires a suit to be brought elsewhere, then the court
must evaluate whether to enforce the clause and decline to hear the case. Id. at 129. If a clause is
merely permissive, there is no reason why the court cannot hear the case so long as jurisdiction
and venue are otherwise proper. Id. The issue of whether an inbound clause is enforceable may
arise with respect to both exclusive and nonexclusive clauses. Accordingly, we do not address
this distinction at any length in this Article. See generally John F. Coyle, Interpreting Forum
Selection Clauses, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1802–03 (2019) (discussing the distinction between
exclusive and nonexclusive clauses).
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clause in one case and an inbound clause in another. Inbound clauses are used
offensively by plaintiffs to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant in the
chosen forum. In the inbound context, the forum selection clause is a sword.
Outbound clauses are used defensively by defendants who want to redirect
litigation to the chosen forum. In the outbound context, the forum selection
clause is a shield.
In this Article, we are concerned exclusively with inbound clauses. We
address outbound clauses in other work. 37 The question of whether an
inbound clause is enforceable generally arises in one of two contexts. 38 First,
it may arise when a plaintiff invokes the clause as a basis for asserting
personal jurisdiction over the defendant in a lawsuit. This is the most
common scenario where one party seeks to enforce an inbound forum
selection clause against the other. Second, the question may arise when one
party seeks to enforce a default judgment previously rendered by a court in
another state. A default judgment is a judgment entered by the court after a
defendant fails to appear after receiving notice of the action. 39 As a general
rule, prior judgments may not be challenged in subsequent enforcement
proceedings. 40 When the judgment is a default judgment, however, the
defendant may defeat the enforcement action if he can show that the
rendering court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 41 In
situations where the sole basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction by the
rendering court is an inbound forum selection clause, therefore, the defendant
may prevail in a subsequent enforcement action if she can persuade the
enforcing court that the inbound clause was not enforceable. 42
Courts and commentators routinely overlook the differences between
outbound and inbound clauses. 43 This is unfortunate because the clauses
present very different issues. If an outbound forum selection clause is
enforced, the plaintiff may not sue in her preferred forum. She must instead
37. See generally Coyle & Richardson, supra note 3. Our review of the academic literature
suggests that scholars also routinely elide the difference between these two functions. For notable
exceptions, see Taylor, supra note 10, at 799; Mullenix, supra note 10, at 330.
38. Inbound clauses may also have an impact on issues of venue and forum non conveniens.
The Article discusses forum non conveniens briefly. It does not address issues relating to venue.
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 55.
40. See Snap Advances, LLC v. Macomb Off. Supply, Inc., 2019 IL App (1st) 180773U,
¶ 31.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., United Leasing Corp. v. Plumides, 531 S.E.2d 891, 893 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
The court will apply the law of the state where the default judgment was rendered to determine
whether the clause is enforceable. Id.
43. See, e.g., Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 571 U.S. 49 (2013); The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). See generally Tanya J. Monestier, When Forum
Selection Clauses Meet Choice of Law Clauses, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 325 (2019).
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refile her claim in the court named in the forum selection clause. If an inbound
clause is enforced, the court asserts power over a defendant. This assertion of
power may ultimately lead to a judgment by which the defendant is ordered
to pay money damages. If the defendant refuses to pay, the sheriff may be
dispatched to seize her property and sell it at auction. When it comes to the
enforcement of forum selection clauses, the stakes are generally higher in the
inbound context. Nevertheless, judges and scholars regularly fail to clearly
distinguish between outbound and inbound clauses.
Having outlined the key differences between inbound and outbound forum
selection clauses, let us now turn to the question of whether the U.S.
Constitution imposes any limits upon the ability of plaintiffs to use inbound
clauses to obtain personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants.
II.

CONTRACTING FOR PERSONAL JURISDICTION

As every first-year law student learns, a court cannot hear a case unless it
has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 44 There are at least four possible
bases for such jurisdiction. First, if a defendant is domiciled in the state where
the suit is brought, then the courts in that state have general personal
jurisdiction to hear any and all claims against that defendant. 45 Second, if a
natural person is served with process while physically present within a state,
then that state’s courts have general personal jurisdiction over that person. 46
Third, if an out-of-state defendant has certain minimum contacts with a state,
such that the assertion of personal jurisdiction will not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice, then that state’s courts have
specific personal jurisdiction to hear claims that arise out of that defendant’s
contacts with the forum. 47
The fourth basis for personal jurisdiction is waiver or consent. 48 If a
defendant makes a general appearance before a court after being named in a
lawsuit, then that defendant is said to have waived his right to object to
personal jurisdiction. 49 If a defendant contractually agrees to submit to
jurisdiction in a court before a lawsuit is filed, then that defendant is said to
44. See, e.g., DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 49–117
(6th ed. 2012); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL & JOANNA C. SCHWARTZ, CIVIL PROCEDURE 69 (9th ed.
2016).
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L. § 29 (AM. L. INST. 1988).
46. Id. § 28.
47. Id. § 37.
48. See id. § 32. Waiver and consent may only operate to confer personal jurisdiction upon
a court. See Designs for Health, Inc. v. Miller, 201 A.3d 1125, 1130 n.4 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019).
They may not operate to confer subject-matter jurisdiction. Id.
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L. § 33 (AM. L. INST. 1988).
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have consented to personal jurisdiction in the chosen court. 50 Although
jurisdiction by express consent is generally understood to operate outside of
the minimum contacts framework first announced in International Shoe, it is
subject to the due process provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment,
as discussed below. 51
A. Waiver and Express Consent
The notion that a defendant may waive the right to object to personal
jurisdiction after the suit is filed is uncontroversial. In 1956, the Supreme
Court unanimously held in Petrowski v. Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. that
a defendant who stipulated to personal jurisdiction after proceedings began
waived any right to assert a lack of personal jurisdiction. 52 In 1982, the Court
unanimously held in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites
de Guinee that a party could waive objections to personal jurisdiction by its
conduct in the course of a lawsuit. 53 A defendant’s submission to the personal
jurisdiction of a given court after being notified of the claims being asserted
against it presents no significant due process issues.
When a defendant agrees to submit to the personal jurisdiction of a given
court before it knows the nature of the claims being asserted against it, by
comparison, a more searching due process inquiry is warranted. 54 The
seminal decision addressing the constitutional validity of consent obtained
prior to suit is National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, which was
decided by the Supreme Court in 1964. 55 In that case, two Michigan farmers
had leased some farming equipment from a New York company. 56 The
standard form lease agreement drafted by the equipment company appointed
a New York agent to accept service on behalf of the farmers in New York in
any lawsuit arising out of the agreement. 57 When the equipment company
brought suit against the farmer in federal court in New York, it served a
50. See id. § 32 cmt. e.
51. Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 999, 1072–73 (2012) (“A consent theory changes the constitutional inquiry. First, it shifts
any due process analysis from minimum contacts to the validity of the consent. Under Bauxites,
consent is a proper basis for jurisdiction, independent of International Shoe minimum contacts
analysis.”); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
52. Petrowski v. Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co., 350 U.S. 495, 496 (1956).
53. Ins. Co. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982).
54. Scott Dodson, Party Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 46–
49 (2014) (discussing relationship between waiver and consent in context of personal
jurisdiction).
55. Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
56. Id. at 313.
57. Id.
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summons on this agent—the spouse of one of the executives at the leasing
company 58—who then provided notice to the Michigan defendants. 59 These
defendants made a special appearance in New York to contest jurisdiction. 60
The Court concluded that the contract provision allowing for service on a
New York agent was valid and that the New York courts had personal
jurisdiction over the defendants. 61 In reaching this conclusion, five Justices
agreed that “parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the
jurisdiction of a given court, to permit notice to be served by the opposing
party, or even to waive notice altogether.” 62
Four Justices dissented. 63 Justice Black, in particular, expressed serious
concerns about the practical implications of enforcing consent-to-jurisdiction
clauses. 64 In his words:
It is hardly likely that these Michigan farmers, hiring farm
equipment, were in any position to dicker over what terms went into
the contract they signed. Yet holding this service effective
inevitably will mean that the Szukhents must go nearly a thousand
miles to a strange city, hire New York counsel, pay witnesses to
travel there, pay their own and their witnesses’ hotel bills, try to
explain a dispute over a farm equipment lease to a New York judge
or jury, and in other ways bear the burdens of litigation in a distant,
and likely a strange, city. The company, of course, must have had
this in mind when it put the clause in the contract. It doubtless
hoped, by easing into its contract this innocent-looking provision
for service of process in New York, to succeed in making it as
burdensome, disadvantageous, and expensive as possible for lessees
to contest actions brought against them.65

Justice Black also observed that the routine enforcement of such clauses
would give large companies the ability to sue their customers in the
companies’ home jurisdictions:
It should be understood that the effect of the Court’s holding is not
simply to give courts sitting in New York jurisdiction over these
Michigan farmers. It is also, as a practical matter, to guarantee that
whenever the company wishes to sue someone who has contracted

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 319 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 314 (majority opinion).
Id. at 319 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 314 (majority opinion).
Id. at 316.
Id. at 318–33 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 333–34 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 320 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 326–27.
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with it, it can, by force of this clause, confine all such suits to courts
sitting in New York. 66

Finally, Justice Black made a pessimistic prediction about the future:
The end result of today’s holding is not difficult to foresee. Clauses
like the one used against the Szukhents—clauses which companies
have not inserted, I suspect, because they never dreamed a court
would uphold them—will soon find their way into the “boilerplate”
of everything from an equipment lease to a conditional sales
contract. Today’s holding gives a green light to every large
company in this country to contrive contracts which declare with
force of law that when such a company wants to sue someone with
whom it does business, that individual must go and try to defend
himself in some place, no matter how distant, where big business
enterprises are concentrated, like, for example, New York,
Connecticut, or Illinois, or else suffer a default judgment. In this
very case the Court holds that by this company’s carefully prepared
contractual clause the Szukhents must, to avoid a judgment
rendered without a fair and full hearing, travel hundreds of miles
across the continent, probably crippling their defense and certainly
depleting what savings they may have, to try to defend themselves
in a court sitting in New York City. . . . It is a long trip from San
Francisco—or from Honolulu or Anchorage—to New York,
Boston, or Wilmington. And the trip can be very expensive, often
costing more than it would simply to pay what is demanded. The
very threat of such a suit can be used to force payment of alleged
claims, even though they be wholly without merit. This fact will not
be news to companies exerting their economic power to wangle
such contracts. No statute and no rule requires this Court to place
its imprimatur upon them. I would not. 67

In another dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Goldberg, expressed concerns about enforcing consent-to-jurisdiction
clauses in standard-form contracts:
[S]ince the corporate plaintiff prepared the printed form contract, I
would not hold the individual purchaser bound by the appointment
without proof, in addition to his mere signature on the form, that the
individual understandingly consented to be sued in a State not that
of his residence. We must . . . strive not to be “that ‘blind’ Court . . .
that does not see what ‘[a]ll others can see and understand.’” It
offends common sense to treat a printed form which closes an
installment sale as embodying terms to all of which the individual
66.
67.

Id. at 327.
Id. at 328–29.
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knowingly assented. The sales pitch aims solely at getting the
signature on the form and wastes no time explaining or even
mentioning the print. Before I would find that an individual
purchaser has knowingly and intelligently consented to be sued in
another State, I would require more proof of that fact than is
provided by his mere signature on the form. 68

These arguments failed to persuade the majority. As noted above, the
majority opinion in Szukhent clearly states that “parties to a contract may
agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court.” 69
The most recent case in which the Supreme Court directly addressed the
enforceability of a consent-to-jurisdiction clause is Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz. 70 In that case, decided in 1985, the Court was called upon to
determine whether a federal district court in Florida had personal jurisdiction
over a franchisee based in Michigan. 71 Although the franchise agreement
lacked a consent-to-jurisdiction clause, the Court nevertheless seized the
opportunity to clarify its views as to the enforceability of such clauses in a
footnote:
We have noted that, because the personal jurisdiction requirement
is a waivable right, there are a “variety of legal arrangements” by
which a litigant may give “express or implied consent to the
personal jurisdiction of the court.” For example, particularly in the
commercial context, parties frequently stipulate in advance to
submit their controversies for resolution within a particular
jurisdiction. Where such forum-selection provisions have been
obtained through “freely negotiated” agreements and are not
“unreasonable and unjust,” their enforcement does not offend due
process. 72

In this passage, the Court draws a connection between its prior case law
relating to the enforceability of outbound forum selection clauses—
developed in The Bremen—and the inquiry into whether inbound forum
selection clauses may confer personal jurisdiction upon a given court by
express consent. The Supreme Court, in short, announced that the
reasonableness inquiry it had previously developed in the outbound context
should likewise be used to evaluate whether inbound forum selection clauses
68. Id. at 333–34 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (fourth alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 44 (1953)).
69. Id. at 316 (majority opinion).
70. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
71. Id. at 464.
72. Id. at 472 n.14 (citations omitted) (first quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982); and then quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1972)) (citing Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311).
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were consistent with due process. In light of this doctrinal move, it is useful
to briefly review the Court’s jurisprudence relating to outbound clauses.
B. The Bremen and Carnival Cruise
In The Bremen, a U.S. company wanted to transport an oil platform from
the Gulf of Mexico to the Adriatic Sea. 73 To accomplish this goal, it
contracted with a German shipping company to tow the platform across the
Atlantic. 74 En route, the platform was damaged in a storm, and the ship made
port in Florida. 75 The U.S. company then sued the German company in
federal district court in Florida under federal admiralty law, alleging
negligent towage and breach of contract. 76 The German company moved to
have the suit dismissed on the basis of a forum selection clause in the
transportation agreement requiring all suits to be brought in London. 77 The
Fifth Circuit held that the clause was unenforceable. 78 The Supreme Court
reversed. 79
Outbound forum selection clauses, the Court held, were presumptively
enforceable and should be given effect unless they were (1) unreasonable or
unjust, (2) contrary to public policy, or (3) subject to a contract defense such
as fraud or undue influence. 80 The Court offered three general guidelines as
to when a clause might be unreasonable. 81 First, it noted that a clause was
unreasonable if “trial in the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and
inconvenient that [the plaintiff] will for all practical purposes be deprived of
his day in court.” 82 Second, it observed that a clause might be unreasonable
if it designated a “seriously inconvenient” 83 or “remote alien” 84 forum. Third,
the Court intimated that a clause might also be unreasonable if it was procured

73. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 2.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 3.
76. Id. at 3–4.
77. Id. at 4.
78. Id. at 7–8.
79. Id. at 20.
80. Id. at 15.
81. Id. at 16–18; see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 591–92 (1991)
(“The [Bremen] Court did not define precisely the circumstances that would make it unreasonable
for a court to enforce a forum clause. Instead, the Court discussed a number of factors that made
it reasonable to enforce the clause at issue in The Bremen and that, presumably, would be pertinent
in any determination whether to enforce a similar clause.”).
82. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 18.
83. Id. at 16.
84. Id. at 17.
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by “overweening bargaining power.” 85 The Court observed that international
agreements between sophisticated business entities should generally be given
effect so long as they were “freely negotiated.” 86
The decision in The Bremen was largely uncontroversial. Very few
commentators had a problem with enforcing an outbound forum selection
clause in a commercial contract freely negotiated between two sophisticated
companies in an international transaction. The controversy arrived in 1991,
when the Supreme Court decided Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute. 87 In that
case, a woman who lived in Washington State fell and injured herself on the
deck of a cruise ship. 88 A forum selection clause, buried on the back of the
passenger ticket, 89 designated Florida as the exclusive forum for all
litigation.90 When the woman tried to bring a claim against the cruise ship
company in Washington, the company sought to enforce the clause under
federal admiralty law and have the plaintiff refile her claim in Florida. 91
In considering whether the clause was reasonable, the Court
acknowledged that the facts of Carnival Cruise differed significantly from
those in The Bremen. 92 First, the Shutes could not and did not negotiate the
terms of the form contract on the back of their passenger tickets. 93 Second,
the parties in Carnival Cruise represented a significant shift in bargaining
parity from sophisticated commercial entities, such as those in The Bremen,
to the less sophisticated Shutes, who did not even receive notice of the forum
selection clause until it was too late to cancel their vacation for a refund. 94
Finally, the Court also acknowledged that Florida represented a “distant
forum” for the Washington-based plaintiff. 95 Nevertheless, the Court held
that the clause was enforceable. 96 In so doing, it held that forum selection
clauses set forth in non-negotiated contracts of adhesion requiring an
85. Id. at 12. On the facts presented by The Bremen, the issue of overweening bargaining
power was not really presented. There was not any disparity in power between the two
sophisticated contracting parties in that case, and the Court was unsympathetic to claims of serious
inconvenience, as any inconvenience would have been apparent and foreseeable to the parties at
the time of contracting. Id. at 16–18.
86. Id. at 12–13.
87. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 585 (1991); see also Borchers, supra
note 9, at 92 (surveying the nature of the reasonableness inquiry after Carnival Cruise).
88. Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 585.
89. The impassioned dissent from Justice Stevens points out that the clause was contained
in section eight of twenty-five sections. Id. at 597 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 587–88 (majority opinion).
91. Id. at 588.
92. Id. at 590–95.
93. Id. at 592–93.
94. Id. at 597 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 596 (majority opinion).
96. Id. at 596–97.
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individual to travel thousands of miles to bring a claim could be “reasonable”
under a refined version of the analysis the Court had previously laid down in
The Bremen. 97
After Carnival Cruise, the quest to identify an “unreasonable” outbound
forum selection clause presents clear challenges. If an outbound clause buried
in a consumer contract of adhesion requiring a woman to travel thousands of
miles to litigate her claims against a huge corporation is not unreasonable,
then perhaps no clause is. And if a clause written into a take-it-or-leave-it
contract where the counterparty had no power to negotiate changes was
“freely negotiated,” then that term has no real meaning. It is important to
remember, however, that the decisions in The Bremen and Carnival Cruise
were decided by the Supreme Court while that Court was exercising its
federal admiralty jurisdiction. 98 These decisions are not binding on the states
weighing whether to enforce outbound forum selection clauses outside of the
admiralty context. These decisions are binding on states weighing whether to
enforce inbound clauses only to the extent that they are incorporated into the
due process analysis via the footnote in Burger King.
Against this doctrinal backdrop, let us now examine the due process
framework for evaluating the enforceability of inbound forum selection
clauses.
C. Implications for Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment functions as an
outer limit on the ability of states to assert personal jurisdiction over
out-of-state defendants. 99 Reading Szukhent and Carnival Cruise together, it
would appear that the outer limits of personal jurisdiction premised on
consent are very broad indeed. In Szukhent, the Court held that a contract that
permitted service to be made in New York upon the wife of an executive at
the corporation that had drafted the contract did not offend due process. In
Carnival Cruise, the Court held that enforcing a forum selection clause in a
contract of adhesion when the plaintiff was an unsophisticated consumer was
reasonable under the test set forth in The Bremen. In light of these decisions,
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would seem to impose
relatively few limitations on the ability of states to assert jurisdiction over
97. Id. at 593–94.
98. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972); Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S.
at 590.
99. Due Process and Personal Jurisdiction: Doctrine and Practice, CONST. ANNOTATED,
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt5_4_6_1_1/
[https://perma.cc/EH7SY4XM].

84

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

out-of-state defendants who have consented to jurisdiction in the forum. 100
Accordingly, cases in which the courts have refused to enforce an inbound
forum selection clause on the basis that it violates due process are
exceedingly rare.
The mere fact that the enforcement of inbound clauses generally does not
offend due process does not, however, mean that they must always be given
effect. There is no rule that the states must always enforce
consent-to-jurisdiction clauses to the fullest extent permitted by the U.S.
Constitution.101 If a state court were to take the position that such clauses are
unenforceable in consumer contracts, for example, such a decision would be
fully consistent with the relevant Supreme Court precedents. Indeed, courts
and legislatures in several states have acted to limit the enforceability of these
provisions. These states’ efforts to develop more demanding rules than those
required by the Due Process Clause are recounted in the next Part.
III.

LAW ON THE BOOKS

In this Part, we first discuss the general rules that the courts apply to
decide whether consent-to-jurisdiction clauses should be given effect. We
then turn our attention to targeted rules that direct courts to enforce—or not
enforce—such clauses when certain criteria are satisfied. The goal of this Part
is to provide a comprehensive doctrinal overview of the law on the books as
it relates to enforcement of inbound forum selection clauses under state law.
A. General Rules
States have adopted many different approaches to determine whether a
consent-to-jurisdiction clause is enforceable. In this Part, we identify seven
methods by which states evaluate the validity of such clauses. Some states
apply the factors laid down in The Bremen and Carnival Cruise without
modification. Others apply a modified version of this test. Some apply the
100. See Aaron D. Simowitz, Jurisdiction as Dialogue, 52 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 485,
510 (2020) (observing that “consent is simply different and insulated from meaningful
constitutional scrutiny”).
101. See Petty v. Cadwallader, 482 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (“[T]he due process
standard represents only an outer limit beyond which a state may not go in obtaining personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident and a state is free to set narrower standards within these limits.”);
see also Green v. Wilson, 565 N.W.2d 813, 817 (Mich. 1997) (“[T]he Michigan Legislature could
have written language into the statutes that confers jurisdiction to the broadest limits of due
process, as other states have done. It chose not to do so.”); Thomason v. Chem. Bank, 661 A.2d
595, 602 (Conn. 1995) (“If the legislature had meant to allow our courts to exercise the full extent
of constitutionally permissible long arm jurisdiction, it could have done so explicitly.”).
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rules set forth in a uniform law known as the Model Choice of Forum Act.
Others have interpreted their state long-arm statute to say that a
consent-to-jurisdiction clause—standing alone—is not enough to confer
jurisdiction on a state court. Still others evaluate the enforceability of these
clauses through the lens of minimum contacts. One state considers whether
the chosen jurisdiction has a rational nexus to the transaction. And one state
relies exclusively on the contract doctrine of unconscionability to determine
whether consent-to-jurisdiction clauses are enforceable. This section
describes each of these various approaches and attempts to make sense of the
myriad, and often messy, ways in which state courts grapple with the question
of when to enforce an inbound forum selection clause.
1.

The Bremen Factors

A majority of states apply the criteria laid down in The Bremen to
determine whether a consent-to-jurisdiction clause is enforceable. 102 These
factors focus on the question of whether the clause is “unreasonable or
unjust.” 103 They ask whether litigation in the chosen forum would be so
difficult and inconvenient so as to “deprive” the challenging party of its “day
in court.” 104 They inquire whether the clause is invalid due to “fraud or
overreaching.” 105 They also provide that clauses should not be enforced when
they are contrary to public policy or are subject to contract defenses such as
fraud. 106 The courts applying these factors will also frequently—though not
always—look to Carnival Cruise for guidance.
2.

Modified Bremen Factors

A few states supplement or modify the criteria laid down in The Bremen
and Carnival Cruise. In the spirit of Justice Brennan’s Szukhent dissent, 107

102. See Desarrollo Immobiliario y Negocios Industriales de Alta Tecnologia de Hermosillo,
S.A.de C.V. v. Kader Holdings Co., 276 P.3d 1, 6–7 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012); Lux Tan, Inc. v. JK
Prods. & Servs., Inc., 2013 Ark. App. 275, at 2–3, 2013 Ark. App. LEXIS 290, at *1–3; Quick
Bridge Funding, LLC v. Sw. Fiber Optic Commc’ns-LLC, No. G054935, 2018 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 5006, at *2–6 (Cal. Ct. App. July 23, 2018); Costas v. Roukey, No. 2017-CV-32627, 2019
Colo. Dist. LEXIS 3113, at *4–5 (Feb. 26, 2019); RSR Corp. v. Siegmund, 309 S.W.3d 686, 697–
98 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010).
103. RSR Corp., 309 S.W.3d at 704 (quoting The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15).
104. Kader Holdings Co., 276 P.3d at 7.
105. RSR Corp., 309 S.W.3d at 704.
106. Id.
107. See supra text accompanying note 68.
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the Minnesota courts consider whether the contract was one of adhesion. 108
The Ohio courts specifically inquire whether the contract in question was a
business contract or a consumer contract. 109 The Kentucky courts look to
whether there was some disparity of bargaining power between the parties. 110
In Illinois and South Dakota, the courts consider a range of factors, including
the location of the parties and their witnesses, to determine whether a clause
should be given effect. 111 As a rule, the states that follow a modified Bremen
approach police the enforceability of inbound clauses more strictly than the
states that follow an unmodified approach.
3.

Model Act

In 1968, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws adopted the Model Choice of Forum Act. 112 That Act provides that
inbound forum selection clauses should generally be enforced if each of the
following statements is true:
(1) the court has power under the law of this state to entertain the
action;
(2) this state is a reasonably convenient place for the trial of the
action;
(3) the agreement as to the place of the action was not obtained by
misrepresentation, duress, the abuse of economic power, or other
unconscionable means; and
(4) the defendant . . . was served [with process as provided by court
rules]. 113

108. Lyon Fin. Servs. v. Arjang Miremadi, M.D., Inc., No. A14-2171, 2015 Minn. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 706, at *9–10 (Minn. Ct. App. June 29, 2015) (“(1) [T]he chosen forum is a
seriously inconvenient place for trial; (2) the choice of forum agreement is one of adhesion; and
(3) the agreement is otherwise unreasonable.”).
109. LexisNexis v. Moreau-Davila, 2017-Ohio-6998, 95 N.E.3d 674, at ¶ 17 (“(1) Are both
parties to the contract commercial entities? (2) Is there evidence of fraud or overreaching? (3)
Would enforcement of the clause be unreasonable and unjust?”).
110. Aries Ent., LLC v. Puerto Rican Ass’n for Hisp. Affs., 591 S.W.3d 850, 856–57 (Ky.
Ct. App. 2019).
111. GPS USA, Inc. v. Performance Powdercoating, 2015 IL App (2nd) 131190, ¶¶ 8, 38, 26
N.E.3d 574, 578, 584; O’Neill Farms, Inc. v. Reinert, 2010 SD 25, ¶¶ 11–20, 780 N.W.2d 55, 59–
62.
112. MODEL CHOICE OF FORUM ACT, reprinted in Willis L. M. Reese, Document, The Model
Choice of Forum Act, 17 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 292, 292 (1969).
113. Id. at 294. Unlike many U.S. courts, the Model Act distinguishes between inbound and
outbound forums selection clauses and lists separate enforcement criteria for each.
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To date, four states have adopted the Model Act—Michigan, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, and North Dakota. 114 The Act was withdrawn in 1975. 115 No
states have adopted it since that date.
The Model Act functions as a long-arm statute for consent jurisdiction. It
spells out when a state court should and should not assert personal jurisdiction
over an out-of-state defendant when the sole basis for the assertion of
jurisdiction is an inbound forum selection clause. Its rule statements do not
always align with Supreme Court case law. As discussed above, the Supreme
Court has set a high threshold for invalidating a clause on the basis of
inconvenience, i.e., whether the party challenging the clause would be
effectively “deprived” of a day in court. The Model Act states that a clause
should not be enforced when the chosen forum is not a “reasonably
convenient” place for trial. 116 The Supreme Court has also indicated that
enforcing consent-to-jurisdiction clauses in consumer contracts of adhesion
is permissible. The comments to the Model Act, by contrast, specifically
direct courts not to enforce clauses that are obtained through the “abuse of
economic power” and note that “[a] significant factor to be considered in
determining whether there was an ‘abuse of economic power or other
unconscionable means’ is whether the choice of forum agreement was
contained in an adhesion, or ‘take-it-or-leave-it,’ contract.” 117 As a long-arm
statute for consent jurisdiction, in summary, the Model Act takes a relatively
restrained view as to when consent-to-jurisdiction clauses should be
enforced.
4.

Consent Plus

Other states go even further than the Model Act in limiting the
enforceability of inbound clauses. In Florida, for example, a
consent-to-jurisdiction clause is generally unenforceable if that clause
provides the sole basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction. 118 The courts
114. Act of Apr. 25, 1974, 1974 Mich. Pub. Acts 168 (codified as amended at MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 600.745 (2021)); Model Uniform Choice of Forum Act, ch. 179, 1969 Neb. Laws 769
(codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-415 (2021)); Uniform Model Choice of Forum
Act, ch. 320, 1969 N.H. Laws 361 (codified as amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508-A:2
(2021)); Act of Mar. 27, 1971, ch. 308, 1971 N.D. Laws 715 (codified as amended at N.D. CENT.
CODE § 28-04.1-02 (2021)).
115. See Cleon H. Foust, Report of the Committee on Review of Conference Acts, 84
HANDBOOK NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. & PROC. ANN. CONF. MEETING 138, 142
(1975) (listing reasons why the Model Choice of Forum Act was withdrawn).
116. MODEL CHOICE OF FORUM ACT, supra note 112, at 294.
117. See id. at 296.
118. McRae v. J.D./M.D., Inc., 511 So. 2d 540, 542 (Fla. 1987).

88

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

may only assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant has
some other connection to the state. We refer to this approach as “consent
plus” because it requires both consent plus something more.
The origins of this rule may be traced back to 1987. In that year, the
Florida Supreme Court was asked to decide whether to enforce a contract
clause consenting to jurisdiction in Florida when the defendants lacked any
other contacts with Florida. 119 The defendants argued that the Florida courts
lacked personal jurisdiction because they had done none of the acts set forth
in the Florida long-arm statute, and none of the parties’ dealings had anything
to do with Florida. 120 The plaintiffs argued that this was irrelevant because
the defendants had consented to jurisdiction in Florida in the contract. 121 The
Florida Supreme Court sided with the defendants. 122 Citing the absence of
any reference to consent in the state long-arm statute, the court held that “a
forum selection clause, designating Florida as the forum, cannot operate as
the sole basis for Florida to exercise personal jurisdiction over an objecting
non-resident defendant.” 123
A similar rule appears to apply in Louisiana, though the case law is
unclear. In 2001, the Louisiana Court of Appeals held that “in the absence of
minimum contacts, parties to a contract cannot agree that a particular court
will have jurisdiction to decide a contractual dispute.” 124 The court based its
decision on a Louisiana statute that declares contract provisions that “waive
or select venue or jurisdiction in advance of the filing of any civil action” to
be contrary to state public policy. 125 In 2014, the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that this same statute does not bar the enforcement of outbound forum
selection clauses. 126 To date, however, that court has not had occasion to
decide whether the earlier decision by the Court of Appeals relating to
inbound clauses was wrongly decided. Until the Louisiana Supreme Court
weighs in on that question, the state’s only binding precedent on this issue
119. Id. at 541.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 541–42.
122. Id. at 543–44.
123. Id. at 542. As discussed below, the Florida legislature subsequently passed a statute that
repealed this rule for certain high-dollar-value contracts. See infra Part III.B. The rule announced
in McRae is, however, still regularly applied by the Florida courts. See TBI Caribbean Co. v.
Stafford-Smith, Inc., 239 So. 3d 103, 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
124. Tulane Indus. Laundry, Inc. v. Quality Lube & Oil, Inc., 2000-0610, p. 6 (La. App. 4
Cir. 1/24/01); 779 So. 2d 99, 102.
125. Id. at 5, 779 So. 2d at 102 (citing Act of July 10, 1997, No. 943, § 1, 1997 La. Acts
1594, 1595–96 (codified at LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:1407 (2021))); see also Calahan v. Haspel, 9944, p. 5–6 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/5/99); 732 So. 2d 796, 799–800.
126. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. of La., 2013-1977, p. 16–18 (La.
7/1/14); 148 So. 3d 871, 881–82.
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provides that a consent-to-jurisdiction clause, standing alone, is insufficient
to confer personal jurisdiction on the courts of Louisiana absent some other
contact with the state. In this respect, it announces a rule that is similar to the
one that is followed by the courts in Florida.
5.

Minimum Contacts

Most states view consent as a basis for personal jurisdiction that is separate
and distinct from the minimum contacts framework. 127 A few states, however,
analyze the question of whether an inbound clause is enforceable through the
lens of minimum contacts.
The trial courts in Maine, for example, analyze the enforceability of an
inbound clause through the minimum contacts lens. 128 These courts have
reasoned that their ability to assert personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants is controlled by the state long-arm statute, which has been
interpreted to authorize the assertion of jurisdiction to the extent permitted by
the Due Process Clause. 129 Under the applicable Maine precedents, due
process is satisfied when “(1) Maine has a legitimate interest in the subject
matter of the litigation; (2) the defendant, by his or her conduct, reasonably
could have anticipated litigation in Maine; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction
by Maine’s courts comports with traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.” 130 The courts have held that in agreeing to litigate future
disputes in Maine via a forum selection clause, a defendant could reasonably
have anticipated litigation in Maine. 131 The existence of such a clause thus
operates to satisfy the second prong of the test set forth above. The courts
must still inquire, however, as to whether prongs one and three are satisfied
before they may assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 132
The Iowa Supreme Court has expressed conflicting views about this same
question. In 2000, it unequivocally held that consent provided a basis for the
assertion of personal jurisdiction separate and apart from minimum
127. See, e.g., Johnston Cnty. v. R.N. Rouse & Co., 414 S.E.2d 30, 35 (N.C. 1992). In some
instances, state courts will conduct a minimum contacts analysis even when they conclude that
the consent-to-jurisdiction clause standing alone provides a basis for the assertion of personal
jurisdiction on a “belt-and-suspenders” theory. See Blue Bird, LLC v. Nolan, No. 302920-V, 2009
Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 9, at *13–14 (Apr. 28, 2009).
128. The Maine Supreme Court has never rendered a decision on this issue.
129. Wolf v. Cullen, No. CV-08-181, 2010 Me. Super. LEXIS 149, at *7–8 (Dec. 6, 2010).
130. Id. at *8.
131. Id. at *9–11.
132. Id. at *8; Coast to Coast Eng’g Servs. v. Stein Eng’rs, Inc., No. CV-06-158, 2006 Me.
Super. LEXIS 167, at *4–5 (Aug. 1, 2006). This test for inbound clauses is different from the test
Maine uses to evaluate the enforceability of outbound clauses. See Clean Harbors Env’t Servs. v.
James, No. CV-06-439, 2006 Me. Super. LEXIS 263, at *3 (Dec. 12, 2006).
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contacts. 133 In 2014, however, it invoked the minimum contacts framework
to evaluate whether Iowa could assert personal jurisdiction over an
out-of-state defendant when an inbound forum selection clause selected Iowa
as a proper forum. 134 As part of its minimum contacts analysis, the court
invoked the clause as evidence that the defendant “‘should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court’ in Iowa.” 135 It also noted that the existence
of the clause served to “reinforce” the defendant’s “deliberate affiliation
with” Iowa. 136 On the basis of this analysis, the court held that the defendant
had sufficient minimum contacts with Iowa to justify the assertion of personal
jurisdiction. 137 It did not explain why this analysis was necessary in light of
its prior case law suggesting that the clause, standing alone, provided an
adequate basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction.
6.

Rational Nexus

Utah has developed its own sui generis approach to determining whether
a consent-to-jurisdiction clause should be enforced. This approach is known
as the rational nexus test. It stipulates that:
[W]hile a forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause by itself is
not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a defendant as a
matter of law, such clauses do create a presumption in favor of
jurisdiction and will be upheld as fair and reasonable so long as
there is a rational nexus between the forum selected and/or
consented to, and either the parties to the contract or the transactions
that are the subject matter of the contract. 138

This approach is facially similar to Florida’s in that it demands some contact
with Utah other than the consent-to-jurisdiction clause selecting the state as
a forum. The approach is distinguishable from Florida’s, however, in that the
requisite contacts need not come from the defendant. As the Utah Supreme
Court explained:

133. EFCO Corp. v. Norman Highway Constructors, Inc., 606 N.W.2d 297, 299 (Iowa 2000).
In upholding the enforceability of an inbound clause in that case, incidentally, the court
specifically held that outbound clauses were subject to a different—and more demanding—test
for enforcement. Id.
134. Ostrem v. Prideco Secure Loan Fund, LP, 841 N.W.2d 882, 901–02 (Iowa 2014).
135. Id. at 902 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980)).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 902–03.
138. Phone Directories Co. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, ¶ 14, 8 P.3d 256, 261.
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Although the rational nexus element does require some connection
between Utah and either the parties to or the actions contemplated
by the contract, it need not rise to the level required under [the Utah
long-arm statute]. This partial departure from the traditional
[long-arm] inquiry when the parties have contractually selected or
consented to a forum has two bases. First, people are free to waive
the requirement that a court must have personal jurisdiction over
them before that court can adjudicate a case involving them.
Second, people are generally free to bind themselves pursuant to
any contract, barring such things as illegality of subject matter or
legal incapacity. When combined, these two concepts support the
conclusion that people can contractually agree to submit to the
jurisdiction of a particular court, even if that court might not have
independent personal jurisdiction over them under the [long-arm
statute]. The potential risks of expanded jurisdiction—particularly
the waste of judicial resources—are addressed by the requirement
of a rational nexus between this state and either the parties to or
the subject matter of the contract. 139

As a practical matter, the rational nexus test requires a party challenging
the enforceability of an inbound clause to show that neither the parties nor
the transaction has any connection to Utah. In contrast to the consent plus
approach and the minimum contacts analysis, which focus solely on the
actions of the defendant, the rational nexus test permits the enforcement of
an inbound clause if the plaintiff or the transaction has a connection to
Utah. 140
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that the “rational nexus test is not
properly considered a due process requirement.” 141 Instead, the test “operates
as a safety valve, providing a mechanism whereby Utah courts may decline
to exercise jurisdiction when Utah has no real interest in the outcome of a
given dispute.” 142 The principal function of the rational nexus test, in short,
139. Id. ¶¶ 14–15, 8 P.3d at 261–62 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
140. Jacobsen Constr. Co. v. Teton Builders, 2005 UT 4, ¶ 43, 106 P.3d 719, 728 (“In this
case, the rational nexus test is satisfied because [plaintiff]’s primary place of business is in
Utah.”); Rocky Mountain Builders Supply Inc. v. Marks, 2017 UT App 41, ¶¶ 8–10, 392 P.3d
981, 984–85 (“Ultimately, a rational nexus exists in this case for the district court to exercise
jurisdiction over [defendant] because [plaintiff] is a Utah corporation and its principal place of
business, corporate officers, and legal counsel are all in Utah.”). The Utah courts have not been
sympathetic to claims that consent-to-jurisdiction clauses are unenforceable in nonbusiness
contracts. See id. ¶ 9, 392 P.3d at 984 (“The only distinctions [defendant] draws between this case
and Jacobsen Construction are that here a relatively small sum of money is in dispute and that
one of the parties to the contract was an individual rather than a business. But courts have not
viewed these distinctions as dispositive in this context.”).
141. Jacobsen Constr. Co., 2005 UT 4, ¶ 41, 106 P.3d at 728.
142. Id.
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is to screen for cases with no connection to Utah. As that same court has
explained:
[U]nder certain circumstances it may be reasonable for a resident of
Colorado and a resident of Wyoming to bargain for a forum
selection clause designating Utah as the appropriate forum for any
dispute arising in relation to a contract to be performed in Nevada.
A Utah court hearing a subsequent action brought pursuant to the
contract could very well find that the forum selection clause was
reasonable under the circumstances, but nevertheless decline to
exercise jurisdiction over the matter due to the lack of a rational
nexus to Utah. 143

The Utah courts have, in summary, decided as a matter of state law not to
exercise consent jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Due Process
Clause. When neither the parties nor the transaction has any connection to
Utah, the Utah courts will refuse to assert personal jurisdiction over a
defendant even when that defendant has previously agreed not to contest the
issue of personal jurisdiction in Utah. 144 In this respect, the courts have
fashioned yet another approach to deciding when inbound clauses should be
given effect.
7.

Unconscionability

The Wisconsin courts evaluate the enforceability of inbound clauses
solely through the contract doctrine of unconscionability. 145 If the clause is
unconscionable, then it is not enforceable. 146 In evaluating whether a clause
is unconscionable, the Wisconsin courts look for evidence of procedural and
substantive unconscionability.147
143. Id. ¶ 42, 106 P.3d at 728.
144. The Utah courts utilize a very different framework to determine whether an outbound
clause is enforceable. In the outbound context, these courts rely on the Bremen factors. Coombs
v. Juice Works Dev., Inc., 2003 UT App 388, ¶ 9, 81 P.3d 769, 773.
145. First Fed. Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Derrington’s Chevron, Inc., 602 N.W.2d 144, 146–47 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1999).
146. Id.
147. Disc. Fabric House of Racine, Inc. v. Wis. Tel. Co., 345 N.W.2d 417, 425 (Wis. 1984)
(“Under the ‘procedural’ rubric come those factors bearing upon . . . the ‘real and voluntary
meeting of the minds’ of the contracting parties: age, education, intelligence, business acumen
and experience, relative bargaining power, who drafted the contract, whether the terms were
explained to the weaker party, whether alterations in the printed terms were possible, whether
there were alternative sources of supply for the goods in question. The ‘substantive’ heading
embraces the contractual terms themselves, and requires a determination whether they are
commercially reasonable.” (quoting Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 268 (E.D.
Mich. 1976))).

53:065]
8.

FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES

93

Summary and Overview

The table below provides an overview of the various approaches utilized
by states to determine whether an inbound clause is enforceable. As the table
makes clear, just over half the states apply the test laid down in The Bremen—
as modified by Carnival Cruise—to determine whether an inbound clause
may be given effect. A significant number of states, however, utilize a
different approach. When there were no state cases from a given state
addressing the question of whether an inbound clause was enforceable, we
denote this fact with an “N/A.”
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Table 1: State Approaches to Enforcing Consent-to-Jurisdiction
Clauses
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas

Approach
N/A
N/A
Bremen
Bremen

California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware

Bremen
Bremen
Bremen
Bremen

Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa

Consent Plus
Bremen
N/A
N/A
Modified Bremen
Bremen
Minimum
Contacts
Kansas
Bremen
Kentucky
Modified Bremen
Louisiana
Consent Plus
Maine
Minimum
Contacts
Maryland
Bremen
Massachusetts Bremen
Michigan
Model Act
Minnesota
Modified Bremen

State
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North
Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South
Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah

Approach
Bremen
Model Act
Bremen
Model Act
Bremen
N/A
Bremen
Bremen
Model Act
Modified Bremen
Bremen
Bremen
Bremen
N/A
Bremen
Modified Bremen
Bremen
Bremen
Rational Nexus

Vermont
Bremen
Virginia
Bremen
Washington
Bremen
West
N/A
Virginia
Mississippi
N/A
Wisconsin
Unconscionability
Missouri
Bremen
Wyoming
N/A
Totals: Bremen (26); Modified Bremen (5); Model Act (4); Consent Plus
(2); Minimum Contacts (2); Rational Nexus (1); Unconscionability (1);
N/A (9)

53:065]

FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES

95

B. Targeted Rules
The legislatures in every state have enacted laws that modify the rules
outlined above for determining whether inbound clauses are enforceable. 148
The laws affecting inbound clauses generally apply to two types of contracts.
First, some states have enacted laws directing their courts to enforce such
clauses when they appear in business contracts or high-dollar-value contracts
selecting the courts of the enacting state. The goal of such statutes is to attract
litigation and other business to the state. Second, some states have enacted
laws directing their courts not to enforce such clauses when they appear in
certain consumer contracts. The goal of such statutes is to protect consumers
against being sued in states other than the one in which they reside.
1.

Enforcing Inbound Clauses in Business and High-Dollar-Value
Contracts

The reliable enforcement of inbound forum selection clauses by courts in
a given state has the potential to attract litigation business to that state. A state
legislature seeking to attract litigation business, therefore, may choose to
enact a statute guaranteeing that clauses selecting the courts of that state will
be enforced. 149
The first state to act on this insight was New York. In 1984, its legislature
enacted a statute directing its courts to enforce inbound clauses consenting to
jurisdiction in New York when each of the following criteria are satisfied:
(1) the contract contains a choice-of-law clause selecting New York law;
(2) the contract is not an employment contract, a consumer contract, or a
contract governed by a specific provision in the Uniform Commercial Code;
and (3) the contract is for at least $1 million. 150 A second statute directs the
state’s courts not to dismiss a case on the basis of forum non conveniens when
these requirements are met. 151 The combined effect of these provisions is to
guarantee that certain inbound clauses selecting New York will always be
enforced, even when the parties and the transaction have no other connection

148. We discuss state statutes directed towards outbound clauses in other work. See Coyle &
Richardson, supra note 3 (manuscript at 26 tbl.3) (listing 190 state statutes that direct courts not
to enforce outbound forum selection clauses).
149. See Pamela K. Bookman, The Adjudication Business, 45 YALE. J. INT’L L. 227, 227–32
(2020); John F. Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate Competition, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1915, 1959–65 (2012).
150. Act of July 19, 1984, ch. 421, § 1, 1984 N.Y. Laws 2583, 2583 (codified as amended at
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1402 (Consol. 2021)).
151. Id. § 2, 1984 N.Y. Laws at 2583–84 (codified at N.Y. C.P.L.R. 327 (CONSOL. 2021)).
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to New York, thereby generating business for lawyers in the state. As a report
that preceded the enactment of the New York legislation explained:
It is the recommendation of this Committee that parties to
significant commercial contracts should be encouraged to submit to
the jurisdiction of the New York courts and to choose New York
law as their governing law. Under present law, however, such
parties cannot be certain that the New York courts will enforce their
submission to New York jurisdiction or their choice of New York
law. In order to add a quantum of certainty and predictability to the
negotiation process, New York law must be amended to provide for
mandatory enforcement of forum-selection clauses and
choice-of-law provisions in large international commercial
contracts. 152

The reliable enforcement of inbound forum selection clauses was seen as
vitally important for New York to retain its status as an international business
center. 153
In the years after 1984, California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, North
Carolina, and Ohio all enacted similar statutes. 154 While the details varied
from state to state—some states set a minimum dollar threshold, for
example, 155 while others simply stated that the legislation would only apply
to business contracts regardless of their value 156—the basic motivation was
generally the same. Their goal was to convey the impression that the enacting
152. Comm. on Foreign & Compar. L., Proposal for Mandatory Enforcement of GoverningLaw Clauses and Related Clauses in Significant Commercial Agreements, 38 REC. ASS’N BAR
CITY N.Y. 537, 549 (1983).
153. Id. at 548–49 (“New York is undoubtedly one of the world’s major financial and
commercial centers. New York’s position, however, is by no means unchallenged. In recent years,
other international business centers have taken affirmative measures to attract foreign business
by providing ready access to a competent forum for dispute resolution. New York law does not
afford such certainty, and New York lawyers consequently face problems in giving opinions that
do not restrain attorneys in other international capitals.” (footnote omitted)).
154. Act of Sept. 8, 1992, ch. 615, § 5, 1992 Cal. Stat. 2739, 2741 (codified at CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 410.40 (Deering 2021)); Act of July 12, 1993, ch. 127, § 1, 69 Del. Laws 302, 302
(codified as amended at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2708 (2021)); Act of June 27, 1989, ch. 89-135,
§ 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 383, 384 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 685.102 (2021)); Choice of Law and
Forum Act, Pub. Act 90-0421, § 5-10, 1997 Ill. Laws 4693, 4693 (codified at 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 105/5-10 (2021)); Act of July 18, 2017, Sess. L. 2017-123, § 1, 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 907,
908 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1G-4 (2021)); Act of July 22, 1991, H.B. No. 221, § 1, 1991
Ohio Laws 3675, 3705–06 (codified as amended at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.39 (LexisNexis
2021)).
155. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2708 (2021) (setting a minimum dollar amount of
$100,000); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/5-10 (2021) (setting a minimum dollar amount of
$500,0000).
156. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1G-4 (2021).
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state was a favorable place in which to do business and to litigate business
disputes. 157
The process that led to the enactment of such a statute in Florida warrants
special attention in light of that state’s unwillingness to assert jurisdiction
solely on the basis of an inbound forum selection clause. In 1989, Florida
enacted a statute that bears a strong resemblance to the one enacted by New
York. 158 That statute directs the Florida courts to enforce forum selection
clauses when written into business contracts for more than $250,000 so long
as the contract also contains a Florida choice-of-law clause. 159 In contrast to
New York, however, the Florida statute is only applicable where the contract
has some connection to Florida. 160 The goal of the Florida statute, therefore,
was not to attract litigation business from parties with no connection to
Florida. Instead, the statute appears to have been intended to partially
overturn the Florida Supreme Court decision in McRae holding that a
consent-to-jurisdiction clause (by itself) was insufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction under state law. 161 While the scope of this legislative override
was limited—it applied only to high-dollar-value business contracts—it
provided reassurance to Florida businesses that they could require out-ofstate defendants who otherwise lacked minimum contacts with Florida to
consent to jurisdiction there if certain conditions were met. 162
Table 2 surveys the similarities and differences between the various state
statutes that address the enforceability of inbound clauses in business and
high-dollar-value contracts.

157. See, e.g., Quanta Comput. Inc. v. Japan Commc’ns Inc., 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 334, 345 (Ct.
App. 2018) (Baker, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur Legislature, in enacting [the statute], has said our courts
should be generally open for business when it comes to this type of foreign dispute.”). See
generally Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware, Lawyers, and Contractual Choice of Law, 19 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 999 (1994).
158. See § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws at 384.
159. FLA. STAT. § 685.102 (2021).
160. See Edward M. Mullins & Douglas J. Giuliano, Contractual Waiver of Personal
Jurisdiction Under F.S. § 685.102: The Long-Arm Statute’s Little-Known Cousin, FLA. BAR J.,
May 2006, at 36, 36–37 (observing that the Florida statute “only applies if either 1) the contract
bears a substantial or reasonable relation to Florida, or 2) at least one of the parties is either a
resident or citizen of Florida (if a person), or is incorporated or organized under the laws of Florida
or maintains a place of business in Florida (if a business)”).
161. McRae v. J.D./M.D., Inc., 511 So. 2d 540, 544 (Fla. 1987).
162. See Jetbroadband WV, LLC v. MasTec N. Am., Inc., 13 So. 3d 159, 162–63 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2009).
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Table 2: State Statutes Relating to Consent-to-Jurisdiction Clauses in
Business and High-Dollar-Value Contracts
State

Year
Enacted

Contract
Type

Minimum
$$$

Choice of
Law Clause

Forum Non
Conveniens

New York

1984

Business

$1m

Required

Unavailable
(by statute)

Florida

1989

Business

$250k

Required

Unavailable
(by case law)

Ohio

1991

Business

None

Required

Unavailable
(by statute)

California

1992

Any

$1m

Required

Available
(by case law)

Delaware

1993

Any

$100k

Required

Illinois

1997

Business

$500k

Required

Unavailable
(by case law)

North
Carolina

2017

Business

None

Required

Unavailable
(by statute)

Other

Contract
must have
connection
to Florida

In 2015, Delaware became the first state to enact a statute that expressly
blessed the use of forum selection clauses in a corporation’s certificate of
incorporation or bylaws. 163 By its terms, this statute directs courts to enforce
these clauses when they select the Delaware courts to resolve disputes
relating to the internal affairs of the corporation. 164 The statute does not
require outbound forum selection provisions that select the courts of another
state (or an arbitral forum) to be enforced. 165 Like the statutes discussed
above, the Delaware statute helps to attract litigation business to the state. 166
163. Act of June 24, 2015, ch. 40, § 5, 80 Del. Laws 1, 2 (codified as amended at DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2021)).
164. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2021).
165. Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract, 96 B.U. L. REV. 485, 489 (2016).
166. F. Troupe Mickler IV, Significant Fee-Shifting and Forum Selection Amendments
BANKR.
INSIDER
(Mar.
25,
2015),
Proposed
to
the
DGCL,
DEL.
https://blog.ashbygeddes.com/significant-fee-shifting-and-forum-selection-amendments-
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Not Enforcing Inbound Clauses in Consumer Contracts

There is a long and sordid history in the United States of companies suing
their customers in jurisdictions other than the place of the customer’s
residence. In the 1970s, companies such as Marathon Oil and Montgomery
Ward routinely brought collections cases against their customers in forums
far removed from the places where those customers were domiciled. 167 In the
1980s, J.C. Penney was accused of engaging in similar practices. 168 This sort
of behavior occurred so frequently that scholars coined a name for the
phenomenon—“distant forum abuse.” 169 The term refers to the practice of
suing people in courts that are so distant or inconvenient that they are highly
unlikely to appear, thereby allowing the plaintiff to obtain a default
judgment. 170 While the problem of distant forum abuse predates the
widespread use of the consent-to-jurisdiction clause, the advent of such
clauses has made it much easier for companies to engage in this practice. In
the early 2010s, for example, one company relied on such a clause to assert
jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants in more than three thousand actions

proposed-to-the-dgcl/ [https://perma.cc/56DB-SYKL] (describing the statute as a “protectionist
measure designed to funnel litigation into Delaware”); see also Helen Hershkoff & Marcel Kahan,
Forum-Selection Provisions in Corporate “Contracts,” 93 WASH. L. REV. 265, 316 (2018);
Matthew D. Cain et al., The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REV. 603, 637
(2018).
167. For examples of this practice, see Marathon Oil Co., 92 F.T.C. 422, 424 (1978);
Montgomery Ward & Co., 84 F.T.C. 1337, 1339–40 (1974); S. S. Kresge Co., 90 F.T.C. 222, 224
(1977); W. Coast Credit Corp., 84 F.T.C. 1328, 1330–31 (1974); Schubach v. Household Fin.
Corp., 376 N.E.2d 140, 140–42 (Mass. 1978); Santiago v. S.S. Kresge Co., 2 Ohio Op. 3d 54
(C.P. 1976) (holding that the practice of suing in a forum distant from consumers’ homes was
unconscionable and violated Ohio UDAP statute). See also Paragon Homes, Inc. v. Carter,
288 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818–19 (Spec. Term), aff’d, 295 N.Y.S.2d 606 (App. Div. 1968) (mem.); Jeff
Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated Transaction
Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1695 (2006).
168. J.C. Penney Co., 109 F.T.C. 54, 55–57 (1987); see also Celebrezze v. United Rsch.,
Inc., 482 N.E.2d 1260, 1262 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a bookseller’s practice of suing
in a forum distant from consumers’ homes was unfair and unconscionable).
169. John J. Sampson, Distant Forum Abuse in Consumer Transactions: A Proposed
Solution, 51 TEX. L. REV. 269 (1973) (presenting empirical evidence of forum abuse in intrastate
consumer transactions).
170. See Moore v. Fein, Such, Kahn & Shepard, P.C., No. 12-1157, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
83428, at *17–18 (D.N.J. June 13, 2012) (“Congress adopted [§ 1692i(a)(2)] to address ‘the
“problem of forum abuse, an unfair practice in which debt collectors file suit against consumers
in courts which are so distant or inconvenient that consumers are unable to appear,” hence
permitting the debt collector to obtain a default judgment.’” (quoting Hess v. Cohen & Slamowitz
LLP, 637 F.3d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 2011), in turn quoting S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 5 (1977)).
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in Illinois. 171 In response, a number of states have enacted legislation that
invalidates consent-to-jurisdiction clauses under certain circumstances. 172
We identified ninety-one state statutes stating that consent-to-jurisdiction
clauses are not enforceable in certain contexts. 173 Virtually every state has
enacted a statute that invalidates inbound clauses in consumer leases. These
leases are the subject of Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, which
was first promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission in 1987. Section 106
of Article 2A provides that “[i]f the judicial forum chosen by the parties to a
consumer lease is a forum that would not otherwise have jurisdiction over the
lessee, the choice is not enforceable.” 174 The official comment to this
provision makes clear that its purpose is to ensure that consumer lessees may
only be sued in the place where they reside:
There is a real danger that a lessor may induce a consumer lessee to
agree that . . . the applicable forum will be a forum that is
inconvenient for the lessee in the event of litigation. As a result, this
section invalidates these . . . forum clauses, except where . . . the

171. Johnson v. Pushpin Holdings, LLC, 821 F.3d 871, 874 (7th Cir. 2016) (observing that
Pushpin “between 2010 and 2014 filed, in reliance on the forum-selection clause, suits in smallclaims courts in Cook County against more than 3000 of the guarantors of leases that the lessees
had defaulted on” and further observing that “[t]he class argues that in invoking the forumselection clause Pushpin was hoping to induce default judgments by members of the class, the
vast majority of whom live outside of Illinois and so would find it inconvenient to defend given
the low stakes, most being below $5000 and many below $3000”).
172. Some states provide consumers with a cause of action against a counterparty that sues
them in a jurisdiction other than their place of residence. Texas has enacted legislation that states
the term
“false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices” includes, but is not limited
to, . . . filing suit founded upon a written contractual obligation of and signed
by the defendant to pay money arising out of or based on a consumer
transaction for goods, services, loans, or extensions of credit intended
primarily for personal, family, household, or agricultural use in any county
other than in the county in which the defendant resides at the time of the
commencement of the action or in the county in which the defendant in fact
signed the contract.
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(23) (West 2021). The Ohio courts have similarly
concluded that “suing consumers in a jurisdiction other than where the consumer resides or signed
the contract is an unfair or deceptive practice in violation of [an Ohio statute prohibiting unfair or
deceptive practices in consumer sales].” Celebrezze, 482 N.E.2d at 1261.
173. A complete list of these statutes, organized by state, appears in the Appendix.
174. U.C.C. § 2A-106(2) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1987) (emphasis added). A
consumer lease is “a lease that a lessor regularly engaged in the business of leasing or selling
makes to a lessee who is an individual and who takes under the lease primarily for a personal,
family, or household purpose.” Id. § 2A-103(1)(e).
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forum chosen is one that otherwise would have jurisdiction over the
lessee. 175

To date, forty-nine states have written Article 2A into their respective
commercial codes. The fiftieth state—Louisiana—has enacted a standalone
statute that invalidates consent-to-jurisdiction clauses in leases for all
movable property. 176 Consequently, forum selection clauses in consumer
leases are generally unenforceable to the extent they require the lessee to
consent to jurisdiction in a state that is not the state of his or her residence.
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code—which has been enacted by eleven
states—also contains language that directs courts not to enforce
consent-to-jurisdiction clauses. It invalidates any provision in a consumer
credit agreement whereby “the consumer consents to the jurisdiction of the
court that does not otherwise have jurisdiction.” 177 This language seeks to
protect consumers against being sued outside of their home state when they
enter into a loan agreement with an out-of-state lender. Other states have
enacted similar statutes that apply to other types of contracts. Washington,
for example, has a statute that provides that a student loan agreement is
voidable if it contains a provision whereby the student “consents to the
jurisdiction of another state.” 178 Tennessee has enacted a similar statute that
applies to payday lenders. 179 Colorado invalidates contract provisions in
foreclosure consulting agreements where the borrower is required to consent
to jurisdiction in “a state other than Colorado.” 180 The goal in each instance
is the same—to protect in-state residents from being forced to defend
themselves in litigation in other states. A complete list of state statutes in this
vein appears in the Appendix.
A bit later in the Article, we will explain why many of these and other
well-intentioned statutes that seek to protect consumers are sometimes
ineffectual. We will also offer some suggestions for ways to better protect
consumers, students, and other in-state residents who are the intended

175. Id. § 2A-106 cmt.
176. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:3303(F)(1) (2021) (“The following agreements by Louisiana
lessees are invalid with respect to leases of movable property, or any modifications thereof, to
which this Chapter applies: [a]greements in which the lessee consents to the jurisdiction of
another state.”).
177. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 1.201(8)(e) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE L. 1974).
178. WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.85.140 (2021).
179. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-17-112 (2021) (stating that a contract provision whereby the
“customer consents to the jurisdiction of another state or foreign country” is void on public policy
grounds).
180. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-1106(1)(b) (2021).
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beneficiaries of such provisions. 181 Before addressing these proposals,
however, we must first consider how the various doctrinal rules described
above are applied in practice. This is the subject of the next Part.
IV.

LAW IN ACTION

Legal scholars have long distinguished between “law on the books” and
“law in action.” The law on the books is “the content of statutes, regulations,
and judicial decisions,” while the law in action “refers to regularities
describing how legal authorities enforce the ‘law on the books.’” 182 In the
previous Part, we surveyed the law on the books as it relates to the
enforcement of inbound forum selection clauses. In this Part, we turn our
attention to how state courts apply and enforce that law. After describing our
methodological approach and offering a summary of our empirical findings,
we show that regardless of which method states purport to use in deciding
whether to give effect to inbound forum selection clauses, they refuse to
enforce them for just a handful of reasons that fall into predictable categories.
A. Methods
To assess how state courts behave in practice when asked to enforce
inbound forum selection clauses, we set out to find every state case where
this issue had been litigated. We began by conducting a search in Lexis
Advance for the terms “choice of court clause” or “forum selection clause”
or “choice of forum clause” or “consent to jurisdiction clause” or “venue
selection clause.” When we searched for these terms in “All State Courts” in
April 2020, we received 4,256 hits.
We then used the following criteria to narrow the list of cases. First, we
eliminated cases where the forum selection clause selected a jurisdiction
other than the one where the suit had been filed, i.e., outbound clauses.
Second, we eliminated cases where neither party raised the issue of personal
jurisdiction. The primary effect of this screening criteria was to remove cases
dealing exclusively with issues relating to venue or forum non conveniens.
Third, we eliminated cases where one party invoked the inbound clause in an
attempt to persuade a court to issue an anti-suit injunction. Fourth, we
eliminated cases where the defendant argued that the clause was
unenforceable under ordinary rules of contract law, such as lack of
181. See infra Part V.A.
182. Rebecca Stone, Legal Design for the “Good Man,” 102 VA. L. REV. 1767, 1798 (2016)
(citing Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910)).
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consideration. Fifth, we eliminated cases where the only issue before the
court related to the interpretation of the forum selection clause rather than its
enforcement. Sixth, we eliminated cases where neither party argued that the
clause was unenforceable. Finally, we eliminated cases where the clause was
invoked in an unsuccessful attempt to confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon
a particular court. These screening procedures resulted in a dataset of 283
cases. This dataset consists of every modern published and unpublished case
decided prior to April 2020 in which a defendant challenged the
enforceability of an inbound clause in state court.
We then sorted these 283 cases into two categories. The first category was
comprised of original proceedings brought by one contract counterparty
against another. If a plaintiff argued that the Georgia court had personal
jurisdiction over the defendant because their contract selected Georgia as the
forum, for example, this case was sorted into category one. There were 226
cases in this category. The second category was comprised of cases where
the plaintiff sought to enforce a default judgment rendered by a court in a
jurisdiction named in the clause. If a plaintiff obtained a default judgment
against a defendant in Iowa on the basis of an Iowa forum selection clause,
for example, and then sought to enforce the resulting judgment against the
defendant’s assets in North Carolina, this case was sorted into category
two. 183 There were fifty-seven cases in this category.
There are a number of issues with looking to published and unpublished
cases in an attempt to understand the law in action. First, there are
well-known problems with relying on cases resulting in a published or
unpublished decision as evidence of judicial behavior. 184 In an ideal world,
we would conduct a review of state court dockets rather than published cases.
Unfortunately, such dockets are not accessible to researchers in most states. 185
183. The court will apply the law of the state where the judgment was originally rendered in
determining whether to enforce a default judgment.
184. See William H.J. Hubbard, The Effects of Twombly and Iqbal, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 474, 481 (2017) (observing that cases identified through “databases of published judicial
opinions” are “not representative of cases as a whole, both because published opinions are not a
random sample of all judicial decisions, and because cases with judicial decisions are not a
random sample of all cases”).
185. A growing number of scholars have urged empiricists to look to court dockets—rather
than judicial opinions—in order to get a more accurate measure of how judges behave. See David
A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine,
85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 686–89 (2007). As even these “docketologists” acknowledge, however,
looking to court dockets as a source of data is only possible when researching the behavior of the
federal district courts. See id. at 728–29. In most states, it is simply impossible for researchers to
obtain reliable docket information for state trial courts. See id. As a practical matter, therefore,
empiricists seeking to obtain information about state court practice must continue to rely on
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Second, looking to cases may provide an affirmatively misleading view of
how the law operates in practice. The enactment of clear statutes that direct
courts to enforce consent-to-jurisdiction clauses in high-dollar-value
contracts, for example, may make it less likely that the parties will object to
personal jurisdiction. The ensuing absence of any discussion of this statute in
the published cases may give the misleading impression that the statute is not
having any impact when, in fact, it discourages litigants from raising the issue
in the first place. Third, it is difficult to isolate the effect of the
consent-to-jurisdiction clause in our sample. In some cases, the clause was
the sole and exclusive basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction. In other
cases, the court likely would have had jurisdiction over the defendant on the
basis of minimum contacts, even in the absence of the clause. Since not every
case discusses these jurisdictional facts, we included every case where a court
was asked to enforce a consent-to-jurisdiction clause in our dataset. If we
could have screened for cases where the clause was the sole basis for
jurisdiction with perfect accuracy, then our empirical results may have looked
somewhat different.
We acknowledge all of these methodological issues. Nevertheless, we
believe that the data generated by this search—though imperfect—may prove
useful to scholars, judges, and litigants who regularly interact with these
clauses. Our findings are set forth below.
B. Findings
The overall enforcement rate for consent-to-jurisdiction clauses in the
cases in our dataset was 80%. 186 When the clause was challenged in the
original suit, the enforcement rate was 81%. When the clause was challenged
in an enforcement action, the enforcement rate was 75%. This finding
suggests that there may be a slightly greater likelihood of success when a
defendant challenges the enforceability of a clause in an enforcement action.
However, the small number of enforcement-action cases in our dataset—just
fifty-seven—provides reason to be cautious about assigning too much
significance to this difference.
judicial opinions. See id. While this is lamentable in many respects, there is an upside. Although
published and unpublished cases may not be “representative” in a statistical sense, they are
“representative” in that they are for most scholars, judges, and lawyers the “full population . . . of
the cases shaping perceptions of the legal system. Published opinions are all most of us ever work
from.” Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal
Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1195 (1991).
186. This number undoubtedly understates the “true” enforcement rate for these clauses. If
we were to include cases where neither party argued that the clause was unenforceable, for
example, the enforcement rate would rise to 85%.
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There were an insufficient number of cases in most states to allow for
meaningful comparisons between them. However, we have listed the
enforcement rate in each state with at least ten dataset cases in Table 3.
Table 3: Enforcement Rate of Inbound Forum
Selection Clauses, by State (min. 10 cases)
State

Number of Cases

Enforcement
Rate

Massachusetts

12

92%

Delaware

11

91%

Texas

21

90%

New York

25

84%

Michigan

12

83%

All States

283

80%

Ohio

21

76%

Florida

19

58%

The below-average enforcement rate in Ohio (76%) is attributable to a 2007
Ohio Supreme Court case where the court refused to enforce a floating forum
selection clause in a lease agreement drafted by NorVergence. 187
NorVergence was a leasing company that was ultimately adjudged to have
defrauded thousands of its customers. 188 Its contracting practices with respect
187. See Preferred Cap., Inc. v. Power Eng’g Grp., Inc., 112 Ohio St. 3d 429, 2007-Ohio257, 860 N.E.2d 741, at ¶¶ 12–16.
188. NorVergence leased specialized telecommunications equipment to its customers on the
promise that the equipment would lower the customers’ phone bills. See Peter R. Silverman &
James H. O’Doherty, Float Like a Butterfly, Sting Like a Bee: The Lure of Floating Forum
Selection Clauses, 27 FRANCHISE L.J. 119, 120 (2007). This equipment, however, was no more
than a firewall and a router that were incapable of delivering the promised cost savings. Id. In
many cases, customers ceased making lease payments on the equipment when it failed to deliver
the promised cost savings or (in many cases) failed to operate at all. FTC v. IFC Credit Corp.,
543 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (N.D. Ill. 2008). When these payments ceased, NorVergence would
assign the contract to a party located in a state geographically removed from the lessor. See
Studebaker-Worthington Leasing Corp. v. New Concepts Realty, Inc., 887 N.Y.S.2d 752, 753
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to forum selection clauses were singled out for special criticism by the
Federal Trade Commission. 189 The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision not to
enforce the floating clause in a NorVergence lease was partially based on the
company’s checkered history. 190 Three lower courts in Ohio subsequently
followed the precedent laid down by the state supreme court and refused to
enforce identical clauses. 191 When the four NorVergence decisions are
excluded from the case count in Ohio, that state’s enforcement rate rises to
94%. 192
The markedly lower enforcement rate in Florida (58%) is attributable to
that state’s rule that a forum selection clause may not provide a valid basis
for the assertion of personal jurisdiction absent some other contact between
the defendant and the state. 193
In other work, we deployed a similar methodological approach to learn
more about the enforcement rate for outbound forum selection clauses in state
court. 194 In that paper, we found that the overall enforcement rate for
outbound clauses was 77%. 195 The overall enforcement rate for inbound
clauses using the same screening criteria, as noted above, is 80%.
C. Bases for Non-Enforcement
There were fifty-five cases in our dataset where the court refused to
enforce a consent-to-jurisdiction clause and assert personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. A review of these cases provides useful insights into what the
courts actually do rather than what they say they are doing. In practice, state
courts refuse to enforce these clauses for just a handful of predictable reasons:
(App. Term 2009). The assignee would then bring a lawsuit against the lessee to recover the entire
balance due on the lease in the courts of that state. See id. The goal was to obtain a default
judgment. Indeed, the NorVergence Screening Manager Training Manual contained “a copy of
the proposed default judgment and order for permanent injunctive relief” that were to be filed
after the lessor stopped making payments. Id. at 753–54. The basis for obtaining a valid default
judgment, in turn, was the consent-to-jurisdiction clause written into each NorVergence lease
agreement.
189. IFC Credit Corp., 543 F. Supp. 2d at 949.
190. See Preferred Cap., Inc., 112 Ohio St. 3d 429, 2007-Ohio-257, 860 N.E.2d. 741, at ¶ 4.
191. Nat’l City Com. Cap. Corp. v. Bullard, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2010–10–276, 2011Ohio-5780, at ¶¶ 39–42; Nat’l City Com. Cap. Corp. v. All About Limousines Corp., 12th Dist.
Butler No. CA2005–08–226, 2009-Ohio-1159, at ¶¶ 24–25; Nat’l City Com. Cap. Corp. v. Page,
12th Dist. Butler No. 2005–09–381, 2009-Ohio-1161, at ¶¶ 10–11.
192. Similarly, when one excludes three NorVergence lease cases from the numbers from
New York, the enforcement rate in that state jumps to 91%.
193. See supra Part III.A.4.
194. See Coyle & Richardson, supra note 3.
195. Id. (manuscript at 5).
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(1) insufficient notice, (2) inconvenience, (3) a lack of connection to the
chosen forum, and (4) public policy. 196
1.

Insufficient Notice

The most common reason why a court refused to enforce a
consent-to-jurisdiction clause was insufficient notice. 197 In some cases, the
lack of notice led the court to conclude that the defendant had never
knowingly consented to jurisdiction in the chosen forum. In other cases, the
notice problems stemmed from the lack of specificity as to the identity of the
chosen forum. In still other cases, the clause was deemed invalid because the
chosen jurisdiction changed between the time when the contract was signed
and the time when the litigation began. Each of these situations is discussed
below.
a. No Knowing Consent
There are a number of cases in our dataset where the court held that the
defendant had not knowingly consented to jurisdiction in the chosen forum. 198
In some of these cases, the court concluded that a purported
consent-to-jurisdiction clause was ineffective because it did not contain any
clear language signaling that the defendant was consenting to jurisdiction

196. This list does not include contract defenses—such as lack of consideration, fraud, or
unconscionability—that may lead to the invalidation of a forum selection clause on pure contract
law grounds. For cases in which a clause was invalidated on the basis of fraud, see StudebakerWorthington Leasing Corp. v. New Concepts Realty, Inc., 887 N.Y.S.2d 752, 753–54 (App. Term
2009) (NorVergence); Sterling Nat’l Bank v. Mid-S. Tooling, Inc., No. 108920/10, slip op. at 8
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 17, 2011) (NorVergence); Krell Inv. LLC v. KI, Inc., No. 650652/09, slip op.
at 10–11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 26, 2011). For cases in which a clause was invalidated on the basis
of unconscionability, see First Fed. Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Derrington’s Chevron, Inc., 602 N.W.2d
144, 145–46 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999); Leasefirst v. Hartford Rexall Drugs, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 585,
586 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
197. Notice of jurisdiction has been used to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction even
outside of the realm of explicit consent to the forum. See Robin J. Effron, The Lost Story of Notice
and Personal Jurisdiction, 74 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 23, 55–74 (2018) (tracking the use of
notice of jurisdiction in minimum contacts analysis).
198. There were, of course, many other cases where this argument failed to carry the day. See
Vanier v. Ponsoldt, 833 P.2d 949, 959 (Kan. 1992); DMARC 2006-CD2 Indian Sch., LLC v.
Bush Realty at Steele Park, LLC, No. 1 CA-CV 14-0603, 2016 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1557,
at *13 (Dec. 13, 2016); Dynacorp Ltd. v. Aramtel Ltd., 56 A.3d 631, 678–79 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2012); Adsit Co. v. Gustin, 874 N.E.2d 1018, 1023 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Jallali v. Nat’l Bd. of
Osteopathic Med. Exam’rs, Inc., 908 N.E.2d 1168, 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); Blue Bird, LLC v.
Nolan, No. 302920-V, 2009 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 9, at *13–14 (Apr. 28, 2009).
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anywhere. 199 In others, the court held that the clause was too inconspicuous
to put the defendant on notice of its existence. 200 One New Jersey court, for
example, emphasized the adhesive nature of the contract in refusing to
enforce the clause, finding that “[t]he lease agreement itself was a one page
pre-printed form with type on the front and back. . . . The provisions were in
fine print under a paragraph labeled ‘Miscellaneous,’ and were never called
to defendant’s attention or explained to him.” 201 The court also found that the
enforcing party “made no showing whatsoever that defendant was actually
aware or made aware of the significance of the consent to jurisdiction clause,”
and it would thus be unjust to enforce the clause against him. 202
In still other cases, courts have held that the clause was invalid because
the parties were unaware of the clause or because the clause was only
199. See, e.g., Falk & Fish, L.L.P. v. Pinkston’s Lawnmower & Equip., Inc., 317 S.W.3d
523, 525, 530 (Tex. App. 2010) (“Because the forum selection clause was not clear on its face
and required interpretation to give meaning to the language of the provision, we conclude PLE
did not consent to personal jurisdiction in Dallas, Texas.”); see also Swindle v. Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp., 1984-NMCA-019, ¶ 20, 101 N.M. 126, 129, 679 P.2d 268, 271 (“While it is
true that a party may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of a certain state,
such an agreement must be ‘deliberately and understandingly made, and language relied upon to
constitute such a waiver must clearly, unequivocally and unambiguously express a waiver of this
right.’ No such waiver appears in either the contract notice provisions, which are required by
federal regulation, or in the language of indemnity.” (quoting Telephonic, Inc. v. Rosenblum,
1975-NMSC-067, ¶ 19, 88 N.M. 532, 537, 543 P.2d 825, 830)); Telephonic, 1975-NMSC-067 at
¶ 19, 88 N.M. 532 at 537, 543 P.2d at 830 (“[A] contractual agreement by a nonresident of this
State, [stating] that the contract ‘shall be governed by the laws of New Mexico’ and that the
nonresident is ‘transacting business within New Mexico’ by entering into the contract, is not
sufficiently definite, or so unequivocal upon the issue of submission to the jurisdiction of our
courts, to constitute an effective waiver of the constitutional right of due process with respect to
the right to be sued in a forum wherein in personam jurisdiction may clearly and properly be
obtained in accordance with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”); Lindsey v.
Trinity Commc’ns, Inc., 275 S.W.3d 411, 416–17 (Tenn. 2009) (“The trial court found that Texas
Mutual consented to personal jurisdiction in Tennessee based on a provision in Broadband’s
coverage contract that states, ‘Jurisdiction over [insured] is jurisdiction over us for purposes of
workers’ compensation law. . . .’ It is undisputed that the trial court had jurisdiction over
Broadband, Texas Mutual’s insured. We are unpersuaded, however, that this provision shows
Texas Mutual’s consent to jurisdiction in Tennessee.”).
200. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Tricon Leasing Corp. v. Johnnie’s Garbage Serv., Inc., 439 S.E.2d
221, 224–25 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (“Considering all of these factors, we find that defendant did
not knowingly and intelligently consent to the jurisdiction of the New Jersey courts.”); see also
Frontier Leasing Corp. v. Shah, 2007 PA Super 225, ¶ 17, 931 A.2d 676, 682; Tandy Comput.
Leasing v. Terina’s Pizza, Inc., 784 P.2d 7, 8 (Nev. 1989); Sec. Credit Leasing, Inc. v. D.J.’s of
Salisbury, Inc., 537 S.E.2d 227, 232 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000). A few states have enacted legislation
that imposes a “conspicuousness” requirement on forum selection clauses. See, e.g., IND. CODE
§ 15-15-6-9 (2021) (“The forum selection provision of a seed contract must be printed
conspicuously in immediate proximity to the space reserved for the signature of the farmer.”).
201. Bell Atl. Tricon Leasing Corp., 439 S.E.2d at 224–25.
202. Id. at 225.
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discoverable by following a long string of references and cross-references in
an extremely long contract. 203 In each of these cases, the courts held the
defendant had failed to knowingly consent to jurisdiction in the chosen forum
and that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would therefore be unreasonable
or unfair. 204
b. Lack of Specificity
The courts have also sometimes
declined
to enforce
consent-to-jurisdiction clauses where the clause does not name a particular
state as the jurisdiction in which litigation may proceed. 205 In one case, the
court refused to uphold a clause whereby the parties consented to jurisdiction
in the “applicable jurisdiction” without further specifying where that
jurisdiction was. 206 In another case, the court refused to uphold a clause
consenting to jurisdiction in “Pasadena, California Small Claims Court”
because the chosen forum did not exist. 207 In still another case, the court
refused to uphold a clause whereby the parties agreed to litigate their dispute
“in seller’s county and state of choice.” 208 Such a clause was invalid, the court
held, because it did not “tie the selection of a forum to any mutable and
identifiable fact, only to the whim of the [drafter’s] choice.” 209 A different
court declined to give effect to a clause giving the drafter “the option of
pursuing any action under this agreement in any court of competent
jurisdiction and the customer . . . consents to jurisdiction in the state of our
choice.” 210 The court concluded that the clause was “unreasonable and

203. Ins. Co. of the W. v. Smith, No. D047717, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1942, at *13
(Mar. 9, 2007) (unaware); Paul Ryan Assocs. v. Dorvin D. Leis Co., No. A134235, 2013 Cal.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 3062, at *29–36 (Apr. 30, 2013) (cross-references).
204. It is worth noting here that courts also sometimes refuse to enforce outbound clauses for
lack of notice. This issue arises in the outbound context in three scenarios: on cruise ship tickets,
in online contracts, and in contracts where the clause was extremely inconspicuous. See Coyle &
Richardson, supra note 3 (manuscript at 49–52).
205. For cases where the court rejected a challenge to the specificity of the clause, see
Wildcat Mins., LLC v. Superior Silica Sands, LLC, No. 15CV32123, 2016 Colo. Dist. LEXIS
1886, at *6 (Mar. 23, 2016); DeLage Landen Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Leighton K. Lee L. Off., No. A3148-10T2, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3059, at *11 (App. Div. Dec. 19, 2011).
206. Hunt v. Superior Ct., 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 215, 219–20 (Ct. App. 2000); see also May v.
Figgins, 607 P.2d 1132, 1138 (Mont. 1980) (refusing to enforce a clause calling for litigation to
proceed in “a proper county”).
207. Aviation Publ’g Corp. v. Morgan, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2017-12-169, 2018-Ohio3224, at ¶ 14.
208. Lopez v. United Cap. Fund, LLC, 88 So. 3d 421, 423, 426 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
209. Id. at 425–26.
210. Cent. Ohio Graphics, Inc. v. Alco Cap. Res., Inc., 472 S.E.2d 2, 3 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
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unjust” because it was “overbroad and so lacking in specificity that it fails to
provide any indicia of the parties’ intent.” 211
On the other hand, courts routinely enforce so-called “service of suit”
clauses in insurance contracts. In the typical service of suit clause, the
insurance company agrees to “submit to the jurisdiction of a Court of
competent jurisdiction within the United States.” 212 State courts have held
that such clauses operate to confer personal jurisdiction. 213 At first glance,
this pattern of practice is surprising because these clauses would seem to
exhibit many of the same deficiencies as the clauses above. In particular,
service of suit clauses (1) do not specify a particular forum and (2) consent
to jurisdiction in any state where the policyholder wishes to bring suit. The
most likely explanation for this disparity is that such clauses are less
objectionable when the stronger contracting party—the insurance
company—voluntarily consents to jurisdiction wherever the weaker
contracting party—the insured—wishes to sue. The fact that the service of
suit clause was originally developed by Lloyd’s of London, an insurance
market based in the United Kingdom, “as a response to competitor’s
arguments that Lloyd’s was not amenable to process in the United States and
that the potential customer should therefore place its business with a domestic
company that was subject to service of process” may also help to explain the
courts’ willingness to enforce these provisions. 214 It is also worth noting that
insurance companies are unlikely to challenge the validity of a provision that
they themselves put into their contracts as a way of attracting customers.
c. Floating Clauses
Another scenario where courts sometimes refuse to enforce clauses
involves a so-called “floating” forum selection clause. A floating forum
211. Id. at 4.
212. See Buto v. Sirius Int’l Ins. Co., 807 So. 2d 674, 675 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
213. See, e.g., Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 948 A.2d 1285, 1287
(N.J. 2008) (“We hold that a service of suit clause is an agreement by the insurer to do what is
necessary to submit to personal jurisdiction in the court in which the insured has chosen to file a
coverage dispute.”); Ace Ins. Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 59 S.W.3d 424, 429 (Tex. App. 2001).
Although the courts recognize that service of suit clauses may confer personal jurisdiction on a
court, the courts still reserve the right to dismiss such suits on the grounds of forum non
conveniens. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 555 N.E.2d 214, 220–22
(Mass. 1990); Ace Ins. Co., 59 S.W.3d at 427; Cannelton Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. of
Am., 460 S.E.2d 1, 17–18 (W. Va. 1994); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. JCH Syndicate 488, 663 N.E.2d
635, 638 (N.Y. 1996); Whirlpool Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 662 N.E.2d
467, 472 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
214. Price v. Brown Grp., Inc., 619 N.Y.S.2d 414, 417 (App. Div. 1994) (citing Appalachian
Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 208 Cal. Rptr. 627, 629–30 (Ct. App. 1984)); see also 7 DANIEL W.
GERBER ET AL., NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 80.03 (2020).
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selection clause is a clause that names a specific forum but acknowledges that
the choice may change at some point in the future. A typical floating clause
reads:
This agreement shall be governed by . . . the laws of the State in
which Rentor’s principal offices are located or, if this Lease is
assigned by Rentor, the State in which the assignees’ principal
offices are located . . . and all legal actions relating to this Lease
shall be venued exclusively in a state or federal court located within
that State . . . .215

Under the terms of this clause, the forum is initially fixed in the state where
the lessor’s principal offices are located. If the contract is assigned to a third
party, however, or if the lessor’s office changes location, the chosen forum
will change to that state instead.
Clauses with very similar language to the one quoted above were litigated
in state and federal courts across the United States over a fifteen-year period
beginning in 1996. 216 In many instances, the courts upheld these clauses as
valid. 217 In other cases, however, the courts refused to enforce them. In 2000,
for example, the New Jersey Court of Appeals refused to enforce a floating
clause because “a prospective lessee cannot identify the jurisdiction in which
an action will be brought.” 218 Since the clause failed to provide proper notice
to the defendant as to the forum in which he was consenting to suit, it was
deemed “unfair and unreasonable.” 219 In 2011, the Ohio Court of Appeals
invalidated a similar clause because “even a careful reading of the clause by
a signatory would not answer the question of where he may be forced to
defend or assert his contractual rights.” 220 In each case, the court held that the
lack of proper notice as to the identity of the chosen forum meant that the
215. Preferred Cap., Inc. v. Power Eng’g Grp., Inc., 112 Ohio St. 3d 429, 2007-Ohio-257,
860 N.E.2d 741, at ¶ 2.
216. See Paul Hartman Cross & Hubert Oxford, IV, “Floating” Forum Selection and Choice
of Law Clauses, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 125, 135–53 (2006).
217. For cases where courts enforced floating forum selection clauses notwithstanding
insufficient notice challenges, see, for example, OFC Cap. v. Colonial Distribs., Inc., 648 S.E.2d
140 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); OFC Cap. v. Schmidtlein Elec., Inc., 656 S.E.2d 272, 273–74 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2008); Pro. Sols. Fin. Servs. v. Richard Yeager & Assocs., D.D.S., P.A., 722 S.E.2d 212
(N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (unpublished table decision); Susquehanna Patriot Com. Leasing Co. v.
Holper Indus., Inc., 2007 PA Super 173, ¶ 13, 928 A.2d 278, 283.
218. Copelco Cap., Inc. v. Shapiro, 750 A.2d 773, 775 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).
219. Id. at 776.
220. Nat’l City Com. Cap. Corp. v. Bullard, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2010–10–276, 2011Ohio-5780, at ¶ 25; see also Preferred Cap., Inc. v. Check Mate Priority Servs., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 89894, 2008-Ohio-2657, at ¶¶ 7–9; Nat’l City Com. Cap. Corp. v. S & S Overseas,
Inc., No. CV2004-08-2545, 2010 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 22524, at *7 (C.P. Sept. 24, 2010).
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clause did not provide a valid basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over the defendant.
2.

Inconvenience

The second category where inbound forum selection clauses sometimes
go unenforced relates to the convenience of the chosen forum for the litigants.
The courts apply two different standards to resolve this question. The first
derives from The Bremen. The second derives from the Model Choice of
Forum Act.
In The Bremen, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a forum selection clause
should not be enforced if “trial in the contractual forum will be so gravely
difficult and inconvenient that [the party challenging the clause] will for all
practical purposes be deprived of his day in court.” 221 This is a stringent
standard. In our review of state cases, we identified just a single instance
where a court invoked this standard and then went on to invalidate a clause
partly on the basis of inconvenience. 222 Apart from this one case, we were
unable to identify any state cases where the court applied the high standard
for inconvenience set forth in The Bremen to invalidate a clause. This finding
suggests that, as a practical matter, the standard is so demanding that it will
virtually never be satisfied.
The statutory test set forth in the Model Choice of Forum Act provides
that a court should refuse to enforce an inbound clause where the chosen
forum is not a “reasonably convenient place for the trial of the action.” 223 This
standard is less demanding than the standard set forth in The Bremen. It is
one thing to show that a forum is not “reasonably convenient.” It is quite
another to show that litigation in the chosen forum is “so gravely difficult and
inconvenient that [the challenger] will for all practical purposes be deprived
221. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972).
222. See inVentiv Health Commc’ns, Inc. v. Rodden, 2018-Ohio-945, 108 N.E.3d 605, at ¶¶
35–36 (1st Dist.). In the two other cases where the court expressly cited convenience as a factor
in declining to enforce a clause, it did not reference the Bremen standard. See Fairfield Lease
Corp. v. Liberty Temple Universal Church of Christ, Inc., 535 A.2d 563, 566–67 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1987); see also Pennhurst Med. Grp. v. Johnson, 29 Pa. D. & C.4th 475, 480 (C.P.
1995). In cases where the courts did reference the Bremen standard, they virtually always enforced
the clause against an inconvenience argument. For cases where courts enforced these clauses
notwithstanding an inconvenience argument, see, for example, Morgan Bank v. Wilson, 794 P.2d
959, 963 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); SD Leasing, Inc. v. Al Spain & Assocs., 640 S.W.2d 451, 452
(Ark. 1982); Juch-Tech v. Bentley-Walker, Ltd., No. HHDCV136045600S, 2014 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 1227, at *7 (May 16, 2014); Carlyle Inv. Mgmt. L.L.C. v. Nat’l Indus. Grp. Holding, No.
5527-CS, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 238, at *22–24 (Oct. 11, 2012), aff’d, 67 A.3d 373 (Del. 2013).
223. MODEL CHOICE OF FORUM ACT, supra note 112, at 294.
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of his day in court.” 224 Unsurprisingly, the preponderance of cases where the
courts have refused to enforce consent-to-jurisdiction clauses on the grounds
that the chosen forum is inconvenient come from cases where the judge was
applying the Model Act. 225
3.

Lack of Connection to Chosen Jurisdiction

A third reason why state courts occasionally refuse to enforce
consent-to-jurisdiction clauses is that neither the parties nor the transaction
have any connection to the chosen forum. 226 While this argument carried the
day in a few cases, it proved unavailing in many others. 227
One example of a case where this argument was successful is Kaser USA,
LLC v. Seabreeze Trading Corp., which was decided by the Vermont
Supreme Court in 2012. 228 In that case, the contracting parties had agreed
“that the courts of [Kaser]’s place of business shall have non-exclusive
jurisdiction to settle any dispute arising out this Agreement.” 229 At the time
the contract was executed, Kaser was headquartered in Vermont. 230 In the
years between signing and the onset of litigation, however, all of Kaser’s
224. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 18.
225. See Banc of Am. Leasing & Cap., LLC v. Bortolotti Constr., Inc., No. 119309, 2011
Mass. Super. LEXIS 365, at *8 (Jan. 13, 2011) (applying Michigan law); Lease Acceptance Corp.
v. Abel, 767 N.W.2d 656, 657 (Mich. 2009); Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. O’Connell Landscape
Maint., Inc., No. A-18-709, 2019 Neb. App. LEXIS 317, at *4–5 (Oct. 22, 2019); Applied
Underwriters Inc. v. Dinyari Inc., No. A-07-058, 2008 Neb. App. LEXIS 101, at *15 (May 20,
2008); Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Co. v. E.M. Pizza, Inc., 923 N.W.2d 789,
800 (Neb. Ct. App. 2019); Woodmen of World Life Ins. Soc’y v. Puccio, 499 N.W.2d 85, 88
(Neb. Ct. App. 1993). In Nebraska, the courts put the burden on the plaintiff to show that the
chosen forum is reasonably convenient. See Dinyari Inc., 2008 Neb. App. LEXIS 101, at *8. In
other states, the burden is on the defendant to show that the chosen forum is not reasonably
convenient. This difference helps to explain why there are so many cases in Nebraska where the
courts refused to enforce a clause on the basis of convenience.
226. See Lectric’s & Inc. v. Power Controls, Inc., No. 94-2564, 1995 Mass. Super. LEXIS
476, at *7 (Feb. 24, 1995) (concluding that “the lack of contacts between the present dispute and
the selected forum renders the forum selection clause in this case ‘unreasonable’ and
unenforceable”); Econ. Steel Bldg. Techs., LLC v. E. W. Constr., Inc., No. S19C-07-040, 2020
Del. Super. LEXIS 169, at *7 (Apr. 14, 2020) (“Where the parties do business in California, sign
the Agreements in California, and perform the Agreements in California, neither choice of law
nor forum selection principles permit litigation of a dispute arising therefrom in Delaware.”).
227. See U.S. Tr. Co. v. Bohart, 495 A.2d 1034, 1040 (Conn. 1985); Desarrollo Immobiliario
y Negocios Industriales de Alta Tecnologia de Hermosillo, S.A. de C.V. v. Kader Holdings Co.,
276 P.3d 1, 6–7 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012); Lux Tan, Inc. v. Jk Prods. & Servs., Inc., 2013 Ark. App.
275, at 2–3, 2013 Ark. App. LEXIS 290, at *2–4.
228. Kaser USA, LLC v. Seabreeze Trading Corp., No. 11-261, 2012 Vt. Unpub. LEXIS 4
(Jan. 26, 2012) (unpublished table decision).
229. Id. at *2.
230. Id. at *1.
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assets were transferred to another state. 231 When Kaser subsequently sued its
counterparty in Vermont state court, it argued that the clause provided a valid
basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction. 232 The Vermont Supreme
Court disagreed. 233 It observed that “any connection between this litigation
and this state ceased when Kaser . . . was administratively dissolved and its
interests were assigned to another company.” 234 The court further observed
that “[u]nder these circumstances, Vermont has become essentially alien to
this dispute—all connections that may have existed when the agreement was
negotiated having been extinguished through unanticipated changes.” 235
Since the chosen forum lacked any ongoing connection to the parties, the
court concluded that a consent-to-jurisdiction clause selecting that forum was
unenforceable. 236
An example of a case where this argument was unsuccessful is Retail
Investors, Inc. v. Henzlik Investment Co. 237 In that case, parties domiciled or
headquartered outside of North Carolina all agreed to adjudicate any disputes
relating to the lease of property located in a Florida shopping center in the
“state or federal courts in North Carolina.” 238 When suit was initiated in North
Carolina, the defendants argued that the clause was unenforceable because
neither the parties nor the transaction had any connection to North
Carolina. 239 The court disagreed. It reasoned that “the parties were fully
aware, at the time the contract was made, that the transaction was unrelated
to North Carolina and that the parties had no substantial relationship with
North Carolina.” 240 The court then went on to conclude that “the basis of the
defendants’ claim of unreasonableness and unfairness was within the original
contemplation of the parties and cannot now be used to support an argument
that the consent to jurisdiction provision is unreasonable or unfair.” 241
231. Id. at *2.
232. Id. at *3.
233. Id. at *4.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. The outcome in Kaser notwithstanding, there were other cases in our dataset where
the courts enforced inbound clauses even though the parties and the transaction lacked any
meaningful connection to the chosen forum. See Pirs Cap. LLC v. Wilkins, No. 655764/2019, slip
op. at 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 4, 2020) (enforcing inbound clause even though parties and
transaction had no other connection to New York); Desarrollo Immobiliario y Negocios
Industriales de Alta Tecnologia de Hermosillo, S.A. de C.V. v. Kader Holdings Co., 276 P.3d 1,
6–7 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012) (enforcing inbound clause even though parties and transaction had no
other connection to Arizona).
237. Retail Invs., Inc. v. Henzlik Inv. Co., 439 S.E.2d 196, 198 (1994).
238. Id. at 197–98.
239. Id. at 198.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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Public Policy

The final basis upon which the courts sometimes refuse to enforce inbound
clauses is public policy. 242 At first blush, the use of public policy as a basis
for non-enforcement may seem straightforward. When a state legislature
passes a statute invalidating consent-to-jurisdiction clauses in certain types
of contracts, the courts in that state must decline to enforce the clause on
public policy grounds. These are easy cases. The harder cases arise when the
statute invalidating the clause was enacted by a legislature in a different state,
i.e., the state where the defendant is domiciled. Should the court hearing the
case give effect to the public policy of a different state? Or should the court’s
public policy analysis begin and end with the statute enacted by the
legislature of the state in which it sits?
The courts have answered these questions in different ways. Some courts
classify the question of whether a forum selection clause is enforceable as
procedural for choice-of-law purposes. 243 These courts will always apply the
law of the forum to decide whether to enforce a clause and consequently will
not consider the public policy of other states. Other states classify the
question of whether a clause is enforceable as substantive for choice-of-law
purposes. 244 These states will conduct a choice-of-law analysis to determine
which state’s law should be applied to the enforceability question. 245 If that
242. For a sampling of cases where the court rejected the defendant’s argument that a clause
was invalid on public policy grounds, see Desarrollo Immobiliario y Negocios Industriales de
Alta Tecnologia de Hermosillo, S.A. de C.V. v. Kader Holdings Co., 276 P.3d 1, 6–7 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2012); Bvcibc Funding v. La Jolla Texaco, No. 2001-1584-C, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS
488, at *9–10 (Sept. 26, 2001); Tri-State Bldg. Specialties, Inc. v. NCI Bldg. Sys., L.P.,
184 S.W.3d 242, 249 (Tex. App. 2005).
243. See, e.g., Carson v. Obor Holding Co., 734 S.E.2d 477, 480–81 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)
(“Because forum selection clauses involve procedural and not substantive rights, we apply
Georgia law to determine the enforceability of the clause here, even though it contains a choice
of law provision requiring that the laws of Florida shall govern.”); Golden Palm Hosp., Inc. v.
Stearns Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 874 So. 2d 1231, 1235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“[I]t is generally
appropriate for a court in Florida, as a procedural issue, to determine the validity and
enforceability of a forum selection clause despite a choice of law provision in the agreement.”).
See generally Symeon C. Symeonides, What Law Governs Forum Selection Clauses, 78 LA. L.
REV. 1119, 1124–25 (2018) (“A review of cases in which the action was filed in a court chosen
in the [forum selection] clause has not revealed any instances in which the court undertook a
choice-of-law inquiry in determining the enforceability of the clause.”).
244. See, e.g., Dancor Constr., Inc. v. FXR Constr., Inc., 2016 IL App (2nd) 150839, ¶¶ 69–
83, 64 N.E.3d 796, 811–15 (conducting a choice-of-law analysis and applying New York public
policy notwithstanding choice-of-law clause selecting Illinois); Gen. Med. of La., P.C. v.
Singletary, No. 340298, 2019 Mich. App. LEXIS 240, at *6–17 (Feb. 12, 2019) (conducting a
choice-of-law analysis and applying Louisiana public policy notwithstanding choice-of-law
clauses selecting Michigan).
245. See Dancor Constr., 2016 IL App (2nd) 150839, ¶¶ 69–83, 64 N.E.3d at 811–15.
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analysis calls for the application of the law of another state, then the courts
may apply that state’s public policy to invalidate the clause. 246
Somewhat surprisingly, there were no “easy” cases in our dataset. There
were no cases, in other words, where a court cited local public policy to
invalidate an inbound clause. This is surprising because, as we discussed in
Part II, nearly every state has enacted at least some statutory restrictions on
the use of inbound forum selection clauses. There were, however, several
“hard” cases where the court cited the public policy of a different state in
invalidating an inbound clause. One of these cases was Dancor Construction,
Inc. v. FXR Construction, Inc. 247 In that case, two construction companies had
entered into an agreement relating to a construction project in New York. 248
This agreement contained a clause specifying that any claims were to be
litigated in Illinois under Illinois law. 249 When one company sued the other
in Illinois, the defendant argued that the consent-to-jurisdiction clause was
contrary to New York public policy. 250 The defendant cited a New York
statute invalidating any forum selection clause written into a contract for a
construction project in New York. 251 The question presented to the Illinois
Court of Appeals was whether a forum selection clause consenting to
jurisdiction in Illinois should be invalidated on the basis of a New York
statute when the contract contained a choice-of-law clause selecting Illinois
law. 252
In answering this question, the court first concluded that the choice-of-law
clause was invalid because the “application of Illinois law would be contrary
to a fundamental New York policy, and New York has a materially greater
interest than Illinois in the determination of this issue.” 253 Having disposed of
the choice-of-law clause, the court then conducted a choice-of-law analysis
and concluded that New York law should be applied. 254 It next noted that the
New York statute specifically invalidated forum selection clauses in contracts
for construction projects in New York. 255 Accordingly, the court concluded
that the clause was unenforceable and dismissed the case. 256

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

See id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 1, 64 N.E.3d at 799.
Id. ¶ 7, 64 N.E.3d at 800.
Id. ¶ 10, 64 N.E.3d at 800–01.
Id. ¶ 25, 64 N.E.3d at 802–03.
See id. ¶ 67, 64 N.E.3d at 811.
Id. ¶¶ 76–78, 64 N.E.3d at 813–14.
Id. ¶¶ 69–83, 64 N.E.3d at 811–15.
Id. ¶¶ 78–80, 64 N.E.3d at 814.
Id. ¶ 91, 64 N.E.3d at 816.
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While unusual, the outcome in this case is not without precedent. There
are at least three other recent instances where state courts invoked similar
reasoning to invalidate an inbound clause. 257 It is important to note, however,
that this particular path to invalidation is not available in every state. As noted
above, a number of states classify the question of whether a forum selection
clause is enforceable as procedural for choice-of-law purposes. 258 In these
states, there is no reason for the court to conduct a choice-of-law analysis and
hence no basis for invalidating a clause on the basis of a statute enacted by
another state. 259 Instead, the courts in these states will look exclusively to the
statutes enacted by their own legislature to determine whether an inbound
clause is void on public policy grounds.
V.

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

In the preceding Parts, we reviewed the constitutional framework for
evaluating whether the enforcement of inbound clauses offends due process.
We surveyed state case law and state statutes that explain when such clauses
should and should not be enforced. And we looked at the actual practice of
state courts and how these doctrinal rules are applied in practice. With the
insights derived from this descriptive account in mind, we now turn to the
normative question of how the existing regime might be improved.
In this Part, we advance three proposals for reform keyed to specific issues
raised by inbound clauses. First, we argue that it is unreasonable to enforce
consent-to-jurisdiction clauses written into contracts of adhesion against
unsophisticated actors. Second, we argue that it is unreasonable to enforce
such clauses when the effect is to allow the drafter to change the forum after
the contract is signed. Third, we argue that the Bremen standard for refusing
to enforce a clause on the grounds of inconvenience is too high. In advancing
each of these arguments, we do not argue that they are constitutionally
mandated. In our view, the relevant Supreme Court precedents relating to
jurisdiction by express consent foreclose such an argument. Instead, we argue
that each of these proposals represents good policy. If the states were to adopt

257. See Focus Fin. Partners, LLC v. Holsopple, 241 A.3d 784, 821–22 (Del. Ch. 2020); Gen.
Med. of La., P.C. v. Singletary, No. 340298, 2019 Mich. App. LEXIS 240, at *6–17 (Feb. 12,
2019); Adex Int’l, Inc. v. Ross, No. 2015-015409 CA 01, 2015 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 44935, at *1–2
(Nov. 11, 2015). There is also at least one federal case that has invalidated a clause on this basis,
though that court appears to have subsequently had second thoughts. See Salesforce.com, Inc. v.
GEA, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 3d 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
258. See sources cited supra note 243.
259. See sources cited supra note 243.
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these reforms, in other words, the rules relating to consent jurisdiction would
operate in a more transparent, more predictable, and more equitable manner.
A. Adhesion Contracts + Unsophisticated Parties
A contract of adhesion is an agreement that is “drafted unilaterally by the
dominant party and then presented on a take it or leave it basis to the weaker
party, who has no real opportunity to bargain about its terms.” 260 More than
fifty years ago, several Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court expressed
concerns about the propriety of enforcing contractual cousins to
consent-to-jurisdiction clauses when written into contracts of adhesion. 261
That critique, distilled to its essence, is that it is unfair to enforce a contract
provision that requires the weaker party to travel thousands of miles to defend
himself in a lawsuit brought by the stronger party when the provision appears
in a take-it-or-leave-it agreement drafted by the stronger party. 262
The force of this critique is amplified when the party against whom the
clause is deployed is a consumer, an employee, or a similarly unsophisticated
party. 263 Such parties rarely read the boilerplate language in the contracts they
sign. Even if they were to read the contract from start to finish, moreover, it
is unlikely that individuals without legal training would fully appreciate the
significance of a provision by which they consent to jurisdiction in another
state. This conclusion holds with particular force with respect to internet
contracts. In one experiment, researchers found that 98% of study participants
agreed to terms and conditions in an online contract whereby they consented
to give away their first-born child. 264 Another study found that only one or
two of every 1,000 retail online shoppers access the license agreement when
purchasing items online. 265 All of this raises the question of whether courts
should enforce inbound clauses written into contracts of adhesion against
consumers, employees, and similarly unsophisticated parties.
260. Adhesion contract, BALLANTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010).
261. Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 327 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting);
see id. at 315 (majority opinion).
262. Id. at 328–29.
263. In advancing this argument, we do not mean to suggest that forum selection clauses are
somehow more objectionable than other troubling provisions that sometimes appear in contracts
of adhesion. We simply note that forum selection clauses create unique problems that may be
productively addressed by relatively minor doctrinal tweaks that build on existing case law.
264. Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on the Internet: Ignoring the
Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking Services, 23 INFO. COMMC’N
& SOC’Y 128 (2020).
265. Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the
Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2014).
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To be sure, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Carnival Cruise that forum
selection clauses are presumptively enforceable in consumer contracts. 266
There are, however, two reasons why the states can and should ignore
Carnival Cruise in this context. First, the case was decided by the Supreme
Court in its exercise of admiralty jurisdiction. 267 It does not bind the states as
a matter of common law. The states are therefore free to ignore it in
non-admiralty cases. Second, the issue before the Court in Carnival Cruise
concerned the enforceability of an outbound clause. The Court was asked to
decide whether a clause required a cruise ship passenger domiciled in
Washington to bring her claim against the cruise company in Florida. 268 The
Court did not consider the question of whether the clause would allow the
cruise company to sue the consumer in Florida. If that issue had been
presented to the Court, we believe that Carnival Cruise would have been
decided differently. It is one thing to force a consumer to cross the country to
sue a large corporation. It is quite another to force a consumer to cross the
country to defend a suit brought by a large corporation.
If Carnival Cruise can be safely disregarded, then there is no compelling
argument for enforcing consent-to-jurisdiction clauses in contracts of
adhesion against the unsophisticated. It is profoundly unfair to allow large
companies to use such provisions to force consumers to consent to
jurisdiction in the company’s home jurisdiction. This moral intuition has led
a number of states to enact laws that expressly invalidate
consent-to-jurisdiction clauses in consumer leases and consumer credit
agreements. 269 In Europe, it has led to the adoption of EU Council Regulation
44/2001, which provides that a consumer, an employee, or an insured may
only be sued in the country where she is domiciled. 270 A comprehensive
review of the scholarship on this topic has uncovered no academic support—
none—for the proposition that consent-to-jurisdiction clauses in contracts of
adhesion should be regularly enforced against consumers and employees. 271
And yet. In collecting the cases for our dataset, we came across several
cases where such clauses were enforced in precisely these circumstances. In
Adsit Co. v. Gustin, an Indiana court asserted personal jurisdiction over a
Texas resident on the basis of an inbound clause notwithstanding the fact that:
266. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–94 (1991).
267. Id. at 590.
268. Id. at 587–88.
269. See supra notes 174–175; see also supra text accompanying notes 201–204 (explaining
the intersection of adhesive contracts and notice).
270. Council Regulation 44/2001, arts. 12, 15–21, 2000 O.J. (L 12) 5–7 (EC); see also Scott
Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction in Comparative Context, 68 AM. J. COMPAR. L. (forthcoming
2021) (comparing U.S. practice to European practice).
271. See Purcell, Jr., supra note 9, at 425–26.
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(1) the defendant was a consumer, (2) the transaction in question was for only
$1,100, (3) the clause was contained in a contract of adhesion, (4) the contract
was concluded through the internet, and (5) neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant had any connection to Indiana. 272 In Whelan Security Co. v. Allen,
a Missouri court asserted personal jurisdiction over a Texas resident on the
basis of an inbound clause in a non-competition agreement even though:
(1) the defendant was an employee of the plaintiff who lived and worked
exclusively in Texas, (2) the defendant had no contacts with Missouri apart
from the clause, (3) the defendant was forced to sign the employment
agreement under threat of dismissal, (4) the defendant was not compensated
for signing the agreement, and (5) the agreement was presented to the
defendant on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 273
While Adsit and Whelan represent the most egregious cases, they are
emblematic of other instances where the state courts seem to have collapsed
the inquiry into what is permissible under the Due Process Clause with the
inquiry into what is reasonable as a matter of sound policy. The states are not
required to assert personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants to the
fullest extent permitted under the Due Process Clause. As discussed above, a
number of states—including Florida, Michigan, Nebraska, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, and Utah—have chosen to impose limits on
the enforcement of such provisions that are more restrictive than those
allowed by due process. Other states have passed legislation specifically
addressing this issue in consumer contracts. More states should take
advantage of this freedom to adopt a bright-line rule that
consent-to-jurisdiction clauses written into contracts of adhesion are not
enforceable against consumers and employees.
In addition, the courts should generally decline to enforce these clauses in
adhesion contracts when the defendant is a so-called “mom-and-pop”

272. Adsit Co. v. Gustin, 874 N.E.2d 1018, 1021–24 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“Under these
circumstances, we find that [the defendant] had reasonable notice of and manifested assent to the
clickwrap agreement containing the forum selection clause. We also find that the contract was not
an impermissible contract of adhesion because she was capable of understanding its terms,
consented to them, and could have rejected the agreement with impunity. Finally, we note that
[the defendant] was not deprived of her day in court, inasmuch as she . . . retained counsel,
requested and obtained permission to participate telephonically in hearings, and did, in fact,
participate telephonically. Given these facts, we find that the forum selection clause contained in
[the plaintiff’s] clickwrap agreement was valid, enforceable, and binding . . . . In sum, we find
that the trial court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over [the defendant].”). But see Tandy
Comput. Leasing v. Terina’s Pizza, Inc., 784 P.2d 7, 8 (Nev. 1989) (“It is unrealistic for a
consumer to expect to defend himself in Texas under these facts.”).
273. Whelan Sec. Co. v. Allen, 26 S.W.3d 592, 594–95 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
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business. 274 To date, state courts have generally declined to draw a distinction
between these small businesses and Fortune 500 corporations in evaluating
whether an inbound clause should be enforced. 275 As one court explained: “If
both parties are for-profit, commercial entities, the relative size or
sophistication of the parties is not a material factor.” 276 Part of this reluctance
seems to stem from the perceived difficulties of distinguishing between
“sophisticated” and “unsophisticated” small businesses. As another court put
it: “[W]e are not inclined to fashion [some] type of business-sophistication
standard out of nebulous factors like small, newly minted businesses or a lack
of expertise concerning the particular equipment or service leased.” 277
While these concerns are entirely reasonable, we believe that it is possible
to craft a rule that balances the status of such entities as for-profit businesses
with the reality that the proprietors of many such businesses are basically
indistinguishable from ordinary consumers. We argue that inbound forum
selection clauses should be presumptively unenforceable as against (1) sole
proprietorships, and (2) business entities that employ two or fewer people and
have just a single owner who is a natural person. In these cases, the business
is functionally indistinguishable from the person who owns it. This
strengthens the case for treating the businesses in the same manner as an
owner who engaged in a transaction in his or her own name. The rule is easy
to administer and does not require the courts to fashion a nebulous standard
tied to business sophistication or expertise. And it functions as a rebuttable
presumption; if the plaintiff presents compelling evidence that it would be
inappropriate to treat a business that satisfies the above criteria as a consumer,
then the court may weigh that evidence in deciding whether the presumption
has been rebutted.

274. See Stephen J. Ware, Mandatory Arbitration: Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver
Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
167, 193–97 (2004) (“If the Due Process Clause does require knowing consent, then this
requirement has frequently gone unmet in consent-to-jurisdiction cases between businesses.
Again, business people, like consumers, routinely sign form contracts without reading them, so it
is simply not true that the line between business and consumer parties is the line between knowing
and unknowing consent.”).
275. See Preferred Cap., Inc. v. Power Eng’g Grp., Inc., 112 Ohio St. 3d 429, 2007-Ohio257, 860 N.E.2d 741, at ¶ 8 (“‘Commercial forum-selection clauses between for-profit business
entities are prima facie valid. . . . By contrast, in Ohio, forum-selection clauses are less readily
enforceable against consumers.’ Appellants argue that they are ‘mom and pop’ or small
businesses and should not be considered sophisticated commercial entities. We reject that
argument.” (quoting Info. Leasing Corp. v. Jaskot, 151 Ohio App. 3d 546, 2003-Ohio-566, 784
N.E.2d 1192, at ¶ 13)).
276. Id.
277. IFC Credit Corp. v. Rieker Shoe Corp., 881 N.E.2d 382, 394 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
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While we acknowledge that a rule that excludes for-profit businesses
altogether would be simpler to administer, our review of the cases turned up
a number of cases where inbound clauses were enforced against small
business owners in situations that struck us as deeply unfair. 278 In virtually all
of these cases, a rule for businesses along the lines proposed above would
have resulted in the clause being deemed unenforceable. The application of
this rule would, importantly, not have left the plaintiffs in these cases without
a remedy. It would have merely required each plaintiff to bring suit in the
small business’s home jurisdiction. In cases involving sole proprietorships
and mom-and-pop shops, this outcome is far more equitable than the current
rule that treats such enterprises in precisely the same manner as Fortune 500
companies. 279
B. Notice
In its decisions relating to the enforceability of inbound clauses, the
Supreme Court has never had to grapple with the issue of notice. 280 As a
result, there has evolved a wide range of practices among the state courts with
respect to this issue. As we explained in Part IV, some state courts currently
refuse to enforce inbound clauses when the weaker party had no notice of the
clause. 281 In this Section, we urge other states to follow this example and to
decline to enforce inbound clauses in cases where the defendant was never
given proper notice as to where exactly he was consenting to be sued.
We begin with what we believe to be a relatively uncontroversial
proposition—that the primary purpose of a forum selection clause is to
provide certainty as to where disputes arising out of the transaction may be
278. See, e.g., Frontier Leasing Corp. v. Hunt, No. COA09-275, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS
1272, at *7 (July 20, 2010).
279. When the contract provision in question is an arbitration clause rather than a forum
selection clause, the states are far more constrained in their ability to fashion enforcement rules
that protect consumers, employees, and small businesses due to the preemptive effect of the
Federal Arbitration Act. See Dr.’s Assocs., Inc. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975, 979 (2d Cir. 1996) (“When
a party agrees ‘to arbitrate in [a state], where the [Federal Arbitration Act] makes such agreements
specifically enforceable, [that party] must be deemed to have consented to the jurisdiction of the
court that could compel the arbitration proceeding in [that state]. To hold otherwise would be to
render the arbitration clause a nullity.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Victory Transp. Inc. v.
Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 363 (2d Cir. 1964))); DePuy
Synthes Sales, Inc. v. OrthoLA, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 3d 690, 704 (S.D. Ind. 2019) (“[T]he Court
finds that . . . because the parties agreed to arbitrate any claims or controversies in Indianapolis,
Indiana, this Court has personal jurisdiction over the action to compel said arbitration.”).
280. Cf. Effron, supra note 197, at 47 (arguing that in the pre-minimum-contacts era, the
Court used nascent notice-of-jurisdiction concepts to bolster the argument that consent to the
forum formed a constitutionally valid basis for personal jurisdiction).
281. See supra Part IV.C.1.
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litigated. It follows logically from this proposition that a clause should not be
enforced if a person cannot identify this jurisdiction at the time the contract
is executed. A clause should only be given effect when the chosen forum is
identifiable to the non-drafting party at the time of signing and that party may
reasonably anticipate being sued in that particular place. We first explore how
this argument plays out in the context of a clause that does not name a state.
We then discuss how it operates in the context of a clause that names more
than one state as the chosen jurisdiction.
1.

Specificity

In most instances, a forum selection clause will choose the courts of a
specific state, e.g., the courts of New York. Occasionally, however, the clause
will not reference a state by name. Instead, it may provide that disputes must
be resolved in the courts in the state where the drafter’s “principal place of
business is located.” The latter type of clause is generally enforceable, in our
view, when the other party is able to identify the chosen state with minimal
effort. To illustrate how this rule might operate in practice, consider the
following clause:
This Lease shall be governed by the laws of the state in which the
Building is located, and all legal action arising from this Lease shall
be tried in the county where the Building is located. 282

Since real property is by definition non-movable, the identity of the chosen
jurisdiction may be ascertained with minimal effort by the non-drafting party.
Accordingly, such a clause should generally be enforced. Other clauses
present slightly more difficult cases:
Any actions, claims or suits (whether in law or equity) arising out
of or relating to this Contract, or the alleged breach thereof, shall be
brought only in courts located in the State where Seller’s principal
place of business is located. 283
282. In re Morice, No. 01-11-00541-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 7504, at *1 (Sept. 15,
2011).
283. Shelter Sys. Grp. Corp. v. Lanni Builders, Inc., 622 A.2d 1345, 1346–47 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1993) (emphasis added) (“It is clear, however, that defendants were in possession
of facts that should have alerted them that New Jersey was involved. For example, defendants
executed a credit application and guarantee on plaintiff’s letterhead, which showed addresses for
five offices. The first one listed was the New Jersey location. The remaining four were in other
states, and they all related to differently named local subsidiaries or divisions of plaintiff. No one
who merely glanced at the letterhead would be surprised to find that plaintiff’s principal place of
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Unlike a piece of real property, the seller’s principal place of business is
movable. It may also be more difficult to identify. Nevertheless, clauses
drafted in this manner should generally be enforced because the contract
counterparty will typically be able to identify the chosen jurisdiction with
minimal effort. However, if the seller should move its principal place of
business to a new jurisdiction after the contract is signed, the clause is not
enforceable with respect to the new jurisdiction. To enforce the clause under
such circumstances is to allow the seller to unilaterally change the place
where the buyer has consented to jurisdiction after the fact, an act that
undermines the certainty that forum selection clauses are intended to provide.
A version of this issue arises in the context of a floating forum selection
clause. A typical floating clause provides:
This agreement shall be governed by . . . the laws of the State in
which Rentor’s principal offices are located or, if this Lease is
assigned by the Rentor, the State in which the assignee’s principal
offices are located . . . and all legal actions relating to this Lease
shall be venued exclusively in the state or federal court located
within that State.284

In applying our proposed approach to this agreement, we argue that the lessee
is subject to personal jurisdiction in the place where the lessor’s principal
place of business is located at the time the contract is signed. The lessor is
not, however, subject to personal jurisdiction in the state of any assignee
because there is no way for the lessor to identify this jurisdiction at the time
of the signing. 285 This inability to know precisely where one is consenting to
jurisdiction dooms the clause under the second scenario.
A more extreme version of this issue is presented by a clause whereby the
counterparty consents to jurisdiction in “any state chosen by the drafter” or
business was in New Jersey.”); see also Danka Funding, L.L.C. v. Page, Scrantom, Sprouse,
Tucker & Ford, P.C., 21 F. Supp. 2d 465, 472 (D.N.J. 1998) (“[W]here a forum-selection clause
professing consent to jurisdiction in the state where a party’s or its assignee’s principal place of
business lies is part of an agreement in a sophisticated business transaction, and one party to the
agreement is a law firm, the forum-selection clause is valid absent fraud, serious inconvenience,
or a violation of public policy, notwithstanding that the law firm was unaware of the assignee’s
principal place of business at the time of signing the agreement.”).
284. John C. Kilgannon, NorVergence Maelstrom Rolls On: Floating Forum Clause
Invalidated as Unreasonable, LJN’S EQUIP. LEASING NEWSL. (ALM Media, New York, N.Y.),
May
2007,
at
1
(alteration
in
original)
(emphasis
added),
http://www.stevenslee.com/files/Resources/Articles/JCK_LJN_0507.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
SJ7Y-G3B5].
285. See, e.g., Preferred Cap., Inc. v. Power Eng’g Grp., Inc., 112 Ohio St. 3d 429, 2007Ohio-257, 860 N.E.2d 741, at ¶12 (“[W]e hold that the clause is unreasonable because even a
careful reading of the clause by a signatory would not answer the question of where he may be
forced to defend or assert his contractual rights.”).
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in drafter’s “county and state of choice.” 286 Such clauses are similarly
unenforceable under our approach because they do not identify any state
where litigation must occur. Instead, such a clause gives the contract drafter
the unilateral power to sue its counterparty wherever it wants. Such a clause
provides no certainty as to where litigation must occur at the time the contract
is signed. The chosen jurisdiction is not identifiable to the non-drafting party
at the time of signing such that that party may reasonably anticipate being
sued in that particular place. Accordingly, clauses drafted in this manner
should not be enforced by the courts.
2.

Numerosity

Most forum selection clauses choose just a single jurisdiction. A few
clauses, however, expressly contemplate the possibility that suit could be
brought in one of several places. 287 Perhaps the most common version of such
a clause is one stating that in the event of litigation, the seller promises to sue
the buyer in the buyer’s home jurisdiction, and the buyer agrees to sue the
seller in the seller’s home jurisdiction. The effect of such a clause is to ensure
that the defendant will have a home court advantage no matter where the suit
is brought. Such clauses are enforceable because they provide each party with
a reasonable degree of certainty as to where any litigation may occur.
There are, however, other clauses selecting multiple jurisdictions that
present more difficult issues. Consider the following provision:
Guarantor consents to the jurisdiction of any state or federal court
located in California or in any other state where Lessor has an
office. 288

If the Lessor is a nationwide company, then the clause calls for the Guarantor
to consent to jurisdiction in each of the fifty states. Such a clause is
unreasonable because there is no way for the Guarantor to reasonably
286. Lopez v. United Cap. Fund, LLC, 88 So. 3d 421, 425–26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); see
also Cent. Ohio Graphics, Inc. v. Alco Cap. Res., Inc., 472 S.E.2d 2, 3 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)
(holding a forum selection clause authorizing the lessor to pursue “any action under this
agreement in any court of competent jurisdiction” unenforceable due to its broadness and lack of
specificity).
287. See, e.g., Warren Env’t, Inc. v. Source One Env’t, Ltd., No. 18-11513, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 124580, at *4 (D. Mass. July 15, 2020) (“The Parties agree to submit to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States of America or the Courts of England, whichever is
relevant as noted above, in regards to any claim or matter arising under or in connection with this
agreement.”).
288. Parrot-Ice Drink Prods. of Am., Ltd. v. K & G Stores, Inc., No. 14-09-00008-CV, 2010
Tex. App. LEXIS 2345, at *2 (Mar. 30, 2010) (emphasis added).
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anticipate being sued in any particular place. 289 Under our proposed approach,
the Guarantor would be subject to personal jurisdiction in California because
that state is specifically named in the clause. If the Guarantor dealt with a
specific office operated by Lessor, then it would also be subject to personal
jurisdiction in the state where the office is located. The Guarantor would not,
however, be subject to personal jurisdiction in any other state where the
Lessor may have an office. 290 To hold otherwise would be contrary to the
central purpose of forum selection clauses, i.e., to provide certainty ex ante
as to where any litigation will occur ex post.
We are generally of the view that any clause by which a particular party
consents to more than two jurisdictions is presumptively unenforceable
because it fails to provide proper notice to the defendant as to where exactly
he is consenting to suit. There is, however, an important exception to this
general rule. This exception is the service of suit clause that is routinely
written into insurance contracts.
3.

Service of Suit Clauses

A service of suit clause is a contract provision whereby an insurance
company consents to jurisdiction in any state where the insured wishes to
bring suit. 291 A typical clause provides:
289. Preferred Cap., Inc., 112 Ohio St. 3d 429, 2007-Ohio-257, 860 N.E.2d. 741, at ¶12 (“It
is one thing for a contract to include a waiver of personal jurisdiction and an agreement to litigate
in a foreign jurisdiction. It is quite another to contract to litigate the same contract in any number
of different jurisdictions, located virtually anywhere.”).
290. IFC Credit Corp. v. Aliano Brothers Gen. Contractors, Inc., 437 F.3d 606, 612 (7th Cir.
2006) (“Aliano argues that to be ‘clear and specific’ the forum selection clause must name the
state in which the suit must be brought. The district judge agreed, as have the other first-instance
judges who have held the clause invalid. But the argument ignores the fact that naming names is
not the only method of dispelling ambiguity. Aliano’s lawyer acknowledged at argument that if
the contract had said that suit could be brought in New York or Vermont, or in a federal district
court in the First Circuit, or in a federal district court in either the First or Second Circuit, or in
any state that George W. Bush carried in the 2004 presidential election, the forum selection clause
would be valid because it would be clear and specific. Yet in none of those hypothetical cases
would Aliano have known when it signed the contract with NorVergence where suit would be
brought against it. The purpose of requiring that a forum selection clause be ‘clear and specific’
is to head off disputes over where the forum selection clause directs that the suit be brought. There
was no possibility of such a dispute here, because the forum selection clause designates the state
of suit unequivocally: it is the headquarters state of either NorVergence or, if the contract has
been assigned, of the assignee.”).
291. Pieter Van Tol, Service of Suit Clauses: Do They Also Dictate the Applicable Law in
Q.,
June
16,
2017,
at 16,
Reinsurance
Disputes?,
ARIAS•U.S.
https://www.hoganlovells.com/~/media/hogan-lovells/pdf/2017/2017_june_service_of_suit_
clause_article.pdf [https://perma.cc/D85N-MJUM].
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It is agreed that in the event of the failure of the Underwriters to pay
any amount claimed to be due hereunder, the Underwriters hereon,
at the request of the Insured (or Reinsured), will submit to the
jurisdiction of a Court of competent jurisdiction within the United
States. 292

A service of suit clause does not consent to jurisdiction in a specific place.
Instead, the insurer agrees to consent to the jurisdiction of any court of
competent jurisdiction in the United States. 293 This formulation presents
significant concerns from both a specificity and numerosity perspective, as
discussed above. Ultimately, however, we believe that it is enforceable
because the party drafting the contract—the insurance company—is the only
one who is consenting to jurisdiction. Our concerns about specificity and
numerosity are felt more acutely when such clauses are used as weapons
against the non-drafting party. We also derive comfort from the fact that such
clauses are frequently used by foreign insurance companies who would,
absent the clause, be subject to jurisdiction nowhere in the United States and
who write these clauses into their agreements to attract business from U.S.
customers. In these unique circumstances, we believe the equities cut in favor
of allowing insureds to utilize service of suit clauses to assert personal
jurisdiction over the insurance companies. 294
C. Inconvenience
The existing doctrine relating to inconvenience is difficult to defend. Most
state courts follow the test laid down in The Bremen and hold that a clause is
unenforceable only when “trial in the contractual forum will be so gravely
292. Ace Ins. Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 59 S.W.3d 424, 426 (Tex. App. 2001).
293. If a service of suit clause is deemed enforceable, the tricky question is whether the
insurance company can move to dismiss a case filed pursuant to a service of suit clause on the
grounds of forum non conveniens. Our general view, as discussed above, is that the existence of
a valid consent-to-jurisdiction clause is a factor to consider in a motion to dismiss on forum non
conveniens grounds but is not dispositive. If the insured were to sue the insurance company in a
court of competent jurisdiction with no connection to either party, for example, the court should
have the discretion to dismiss on forum non conveniens if the facts warrant.
294. In evaluating whether an insurance company that has agreed to a service of suit clause
may subsequently seek dismissal or transfer on the basis of forum non conveniens or 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404, the court should apply the usual rules of contract interpretation to determine whether the
clause is exclusive or non-exclusive. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. JCH Syndicate 488, 663 N.E.2d
635, 638 (1996). In evaluating whether an insurance company that has agreed to a service of suit
clause may subsequently seek to remove to federal court or to remand to state court, the court
should apply the usual rules of contract interpretation to determine whether the defendant has
waived its right to remove or to remand. See Southland Oil Co. v. Miss. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 182 F.
App’x 358, 361 (5th Cir. 2006).
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difficult and inconvenient that [the party challenging the clause] will for all
practical purposes be deprived of his day in court.” 295 As discussed above,
this standard sets the bar so high that only one defendant has managed to
convince a court that an inbound clause should be invalidated solely on this
basis in the past fifty years. The fact that the standard was originally
articulated in the context of a case involving the enforcement of an outbound
clause helps to explain this outcome. If a plaintiff must file a suit in a distant
court on the basis of an outbound clause, it is conceivable that this
requirement may lead him to abandon the suit altogether, thereby “depriving”
him of his day in court. If a defendant must defend a suit in a distant court on
the basis of an inbound clause, then that defendant is going to have his day in
court whether he wants it or not. He may either appear and defend the suit or
stay away and accept a default judgment. To apply the “deprived of his day
in court” standard to evaluate the enforceability of an inbound clause,
therefore, is to try to fit a square peg into a round hole.
In theory, one could address this problem by adopting a less demanding
standard. The courts could, for example, apply the “reasonably convenient”
standard set forth in the Model Act as part of their inquiry into whether the
clause is enforceable. 296 Under this approach, a court would import its regular
test for forum non conveniens into the enforcement inquiry. The problem with
this approach, however, is that it is more complicated than it needs to be.
There is no need to “import” the doctrine of forum non conveniens into the
enforcement inquiry when that doctrine is perfectly capable of resolving the
question on its own.
In our view, a better approach is for the courts to simply eliminate
convenience as a factor to be considered as part of the enforcement inquiry.
Under our proposed approach, a court would first consider whether it has
personal jurisdiction over the defendant without evaluating whether the
chosen forum is a convenient one. If the court answers this question in the
affirmative, it would then proceed to evaluate whether the case should
nevertheless be dismissed on the basis of forum non conveniens. 297 This
295. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972).
296. MODEL CHOICE OF FORUM ACT, supra note 112, at 294.
297. See 3H Enters. v. Bennett, 276 A.D.2d 965, 996 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (“In the instant
matter, the parties’ controversy has no substantial nexus with New York. The property securing
the note and purchase money mortgage is located in Florida and the agreement was completely
executed in that State. All the parties and witnesses, with the exception of plaintiff’s president,
are located in Florida. Significantly, both defendants are senior citizens who suffer from health
problems which make it difficult and inadvisable to travel. In order to facilitate jurisdiction in
Florida, they have agreed to admit to service of the complaint and stipulate to procedural matters.
Enforcement of the forum selection provision would be unreasonable under the particular
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approach is, in our view, far more intellectually coherent than the current
approach. There is no compelling reason to incorporate the forum non
conveniens inquiry into the test of whether an inbound forum selection clause
is enforceable in the first place.
This proposal naturally raises the question of what role, if any, the
existence of a valid inbound forum selection clause should play in a forum
non conveniens inquiry. Some states take the position that an exclusive
consent-to-jurisdiction clause operates as a waiver of the defendant’s right to
argue for dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens. 298 Other states
reserve the right to dismiss a case on forum non conveniens even when they
have personal jurisdiction over the defendant on the basis of a valid forum
selection clause. 299 We believe the latter position is the sounder one. While
circumstances presented and, in light of the substantial contacts with Florida, we cannot say that
Supreme Court abused its discretion in granting defendants’ motion.”).
298. See, e.g., Telemundo Network Grp., LLC v. Azteca Int’l Corp., 957 So. 2d 705, 713–14
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (“Where a defendant has contractually agreed to a specific forum and
waived the right to object to it, a court may not dismiss claims against that defendant on forum
non conveniens grounds.”); Paradise Enters., Ltd. v. Sapir, 811 A.2d 516, 523 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2002) (“Settled principles of New Jersey law with respect to forum selection
agreements provide adequate protection for private and public interests, so that where such an
agreement exists it is unnecessary to rely on forum non conveniens doctrine.”); In re Lyon Fin.
Servs., Inc., 257 S.W.3d 228, 234 (Tex. 2008) (“By entering into an agreement with a forumselection clause, the parties effectively represent to each other that the agreed forum is not so
inconvenient that enforcing the clause will deprive either party of its day in court, whether for
cost or other reasons.”); Hogan v. McAndrew, 131 A.3d 717, 726 (R.I. 2016) (“[A]n enforceable
forum-selection clause . . . settles the proper venue for the case and prevents ‘a party that has
agreed to be bound . . . [from] assert[ing] forum non conveniens as a ground for dismissing a suit
brought in the chosen forum.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Sidell v. Sidell, 18 A.3d 499, 507
(R.I. 2011))).
299. See, e.g., Life of Am. Ins. Co. v. Baker-Lowe-Fox Ins. Mktg., Inc., 873 S.W.2d 537,
539 (Ark. 1994) (“We have been cited to no authority which holds that forum selection . . . clauses
control the forum non conveniens doctrine.”); Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 208 Cal. Rptr.
627, 635 (Ct. App. 1984) (“The principle that the doctrine of forum non conveniens protects the
public interest as well as that of the litigants is paramount in our determination that the forum
selection clause in this contract does not preclude the application of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.”); Bongo Int’l, LLC v. Bernstein, No. CV136038740S, 2013 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2942, at *15–16 (Dec. 20, 2013) (“[T]he court finds that despite the strong presumption of
allowing a plaintiff to proceed in its chosen forum, and despite the existence of a forum selection
clause that validly confers personal jurisdiction over the defendants, the court will exercise its
discretion and apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens.”); Oxford Glob. Res., LLC v.
Hernandez, 106 N.E.3d 556, 568 (Mass. 2018) (“Even if the forum selection provision had
specifically included language waiving any objection to the choice of forum, we would not
construe that contractual provision to deprive a defendant of his or her ability to move to dismiss
on the ground of forum non conveniens.”); Home S&L Co. v. Leslie, No. 11CVH05-5965, 2011
Ohio Misc. LEXIS 2010, at *5–6 (C.P. Aug. 10, 2011) (“[T]he only[ ] tie that this case has to
Franklin County is that the guarantee signed by Harold contains a forum selection clause listing
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an exclusive inbound forum selection clause should generally result in the
case being heard in the chosen forum, the courts should have the flexibility
to decide whether dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens is
warranted on a particular set of facts. A per se rule that the existence of a
clause always precludes dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens is
undesirable because it disregards public interest factors that may bear on the
issue of whether dismissal is appropriate.
D. Implementation
There are a number of different ways by which the reform proposals set
forth above could be implemented. Each possibility is discussed below.
1.

State Implementation

First, and most simply, state courts could rely on the common-law-making
process to give effect to our proposed reforms. The best model for such an
approach is Utah. In 2000, the Utah Supreme Court stated that it would
henceforth apply a “rational nexus” test to determine whether to enforce an
inbound clause. 300 The court was careful to state that this was not a test
grounded in state or federal due process. 301 It was merely a prudential,
common-law rule that sought to ensure that Utah courts would not be required
to adjudicate cases with no connection to Utah on the basis of a
consent-to-jurisdiction clause. 302

Franklin County as a forum for suit. While Ohio courts will not normally go against such clauses,
this is one case where it is warranted. In light of all the factors listed above, the Court must grant
Defendant’s motion.”); Package Express Ctr., Inc. v. Snider Foods, Inc., 788 S.W.2d 561, 562
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (dismissing suit based upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens even
though the contract contained a clause consenting to jurisdiction in Tennessee); Quanta Comput.
Inc. v. Japan Commc’ns Inc., 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 334, 336 (Ct. App. 2018) (concluding that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a suit on the basis of forum non conveniens
notwithstanding forum selection clause naming California).
300. Phone Directories Co. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, ¶ 14, 8 P.3d 256, 261.
301. Id. (“Although the rational nexus element does require some connection between Utah
and either the parties to or the actions contemplated by the contract, it need not rise to the level
required under [the long-arm statute].” (second emphasis added)); see also id. at 262–63
(Wilkins, J., concurring).
302. It is worth noting that the Utah long-arm statute—like Florida’s—does not refer to any
state or constitutional due process standard. Instead, that statute contains a list of enumerated acts
that may give rise to personal jurisdiction in Utah. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-205 (West
2021).
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Alternatively, state courts could interpret their state’s long-arm statute to
limit the scope of consent jurisdiction. 303 The best model for such an approach
is Florida. In 1987, the Florida Supreme Court held that since the state’s
long-arm statute made no mention of consent, it violated due process for the
state’s courts to rely solely on a consent-to-jurisdiction clause as the basis for
asserting personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. 304
Still another option is for state courts to interpret the due process clause in
their state constitution to limit the scope of consent jurisdiction. 305 To date, it
does not appear that any state has chosen this path. 306 There is, however, no
federal constitutional barrier to their doing so. So long as the limits placed on
the ability to assert personal jurisdiction on the basis of consent do not exceed
the limits of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the states
are free to do what they want so long as they comply with state law. If a court
were to base its decision on the due process clause in the state constitution,
moreover, the state legislature would not be able to override the court’s
decision by enacting a statute proposing a more expansive view of consent
jurisdiction.
Finally, state legislatures could enact a long-arm statute for consent
jurisdiction. 307 This statute could incorporate the best elements of the Model
Choice of Forum Act and the various proposals outlined above to craft a
modern instrument that balances the rights and interests of plaintiffs and
defendants. As discussed above, a number of states have already enacted
statutes that limit the enforceability of consent-to-jurisdiction clauses when
303. There are three different types of state long-arm statutes. The first sets forth a list of
enumerated acts that may give rise to personal jurisdiction in the state. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-1-124 (2021). The second provides that the courts may assert jurisdiction on any basis not
inconsistent with the state constitution or the federal constitution. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 14.065 (2021). The third provides that the courts of the state may assert jurisdiction on any basis
not inconsistent with the federal constitution. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (Deering
2021). Interpreting the state long-arm statute to limit the scope of consent jurisdiction is most
easily done with respect to the first type, particularly when consent is not listed as one of the
enumerated acts. It appears that the only state whose long-arm statute specifically mentions
consent as a basis for jurisdiction is Oregon’s. See OR. REV. STAT. § 110.518 (2021).
304. McRae v. J.D./M.D., Inc., 511 So. 2d 540, 543–44 (Fla. 1987).
305. Interpreting the due process clause in the state constitution is most easily justified with
respect to the first and second types of state long-arm statutes.
306. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Liberty, Substantive Due Process, and Personal
Jurisdiction, 82 TUL. L. REV. 567, 618 n.295 (2007) (“[D]espite the willingness of many state
courts to offer greater constitutional protections under their own state constitutions, not one has
employed a state constitutional provision to provide additional limitations on the jurisdictional
reach of its courts.”).
307. Cf. Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 17, at 437 (urging states to adopt a “modernized
jurisdictional-consent statute that works in tandem with other constitutional protections” that
would allow courts to assert personal jurisdiction over out-of-state persons where the litigants are
not party to an agreement containing a consent-to-jurisdiction clause).
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written into certain types of consumer contracts. Under this implementation
method, the states would enact a statute that addressed the enforceability of
such clauses in a wider range of contract types and situations.
2.

Federal Implementation

If the states are unwilling or unable to carry out the proposed reforms,
these reforms could also be implemented by federal actors. Congress could
enact a federal statute that establishes a uniform set of rules for consent
jurisdiction across the United States. The enactment of a federal statute would
obviate the need to persuade fifty different state legislatures to enact such
legislation. So far as we are aware, there is no historical precedent for a
federal statute specifically addressing the issue of consent jurisdiction.
However, Congress has on occasion enacted “mandatory” venue provisions
that require suits to be brought in certain jurisdictions and nowhere else. 308
These statutes could serve as models for future legislation to limit the
enforceability of inbound forum selection clauses.
Alternatively, the U.S. Supreme Court could revisit its earlier decisions on
consent jurisdiction and take a stricter view of what is permissible under the
Due Process Clause. The Court could, for example, hold that it is inconsistent
with due process to use a consent-to-jurisdiction clause written into a contract
of adhesion to obtain personal jurisdiction over consumers and other
unsophisticated parties. Given the current composition of the Court, we do
not view this outcome as particularly likely. In principle, however, the Court
has the power to transform the policy recommendations set forth above into
rules required under the Due Process Clause.
3.

Private Implementation

Last but not least, several of the reforms set forth above could be realized
if private actors chose to redraft the forum selection clauses in their
standard-form contracts. As things currently stand, some companies require
their consumers to consent to jurisdiction where the company is

308. See Dabecca Nat. Foods, Inc. v. RD Trucking, LLC, No. 14 C 6100, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 65680, at *19 (N.D. Ill. May 20, 2015) (“[T]he court finds that the Carmack Amendment's
special venue provision, 49 U.S.C. § 14706(d), means that the forum selection clause is not
enforceable.”); Asset Grp. v. Corrugated Erectors, No. CIV-14-0435-F, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
198881, at *19 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 15, 2015) (declining to transfer on the basis of the Miller Act’s
venue provision); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692i.
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headquartered. 309 Other companies merely require their customers to sue
them in the jurisdiction. The forum selection clause in American Airlines’
terms and conditions, for example, states that “any lawsuit brought by you
related to your access to, dealings with, or use of the [website] must be
brought in the state or federal courts of Tarrant County, Texas.” 310 This clause
requires plaintiffs to bring suit against American Airlines in Texas. It does
not, however, give American Airlines the power to sue their customers who
lack any connection to Texas in that state. 311 If courts and legislatures prove
unwilling to implement the reforms outlined above, therefore, there is the
possibility that private actors may take it upon themselves to modify their
contracts to achieve some of these ends as a way of generating goodwill.
VI.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL PRACTICE

Up to this point, we have focused almost exclusively on state law and state
doctrine. It is worth asking, however, if implementing the reforms outlined
above at the state level would have any impact on federal practice. The
answer, in a nutshell, is yes.
In diversity cases brought against U.S. defendants, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provide that a federal court may assert personal jurisdiction
over an out-of-state defendant to the same extent as a state court of general
jurisdiction where the federal court is located. 312 A federal court must
therefore apply state law to determine whether it has personal jurisdiction. 313
This rule explains why the federal district courts in Florida refuse to assert
personal jurisdiction over defendants whose only contact with Florida is a
309. The forum selection clause in Verizon’s terms and conditions, for example, states that
“you and we agree to submit to the personal jurisdiction of the courts located within the county
of New York, New York or the Southern District of New York.” Verizon Media Terms of Service,
https://www.verizonmedia.com/policies/us/en/verizonmedia/terms/otos/index.html
VERIZON,
[https://perma.cc/DDG6-RQ9D] (Feb. 2021). This clause is formally reciprocal but one-sided in
practice; Verizon is already subject to personal jurisdiction in New York because that is where it
is headquartered. The purpose of the clause is to allow Verizon to force plaintiffs to sue it there
and to initiate suits against counterparties there.
AIRLINES
(emphasis
added),
310. Legal
Information,
AM.
https://www.aa.com/i18n/customer-service/support/legal-information.jsp
[https://perma.cc/
Q6F8-Q36E].
311. See Luxury Travel Source v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 276 S.W.3d 154, 165 (Tex. App. 2008).
312. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (“Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes
personal jurisdiction over a defendant: who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general
jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located.”).
313. See Matus v. Premium Nutraceuticals, LLC, 715 F. App’x 662, 662 (9th Cir. 2018)
(“We apply California law in conducting the personal jurisdiction analysis . . . .”); Ariel Invs.,
LLC v. Ariel Cap. Advisors LLC, 881 F.3d 520, 521 (7th Cir. 2018) (“A plaintiff . . . must secure
personal jurisdiction under state law.”).
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consent-to-jurisdiction clause. 314 It explains why the federal courts in New
York look to laws enacted by that state’s legislature for guidance as to
whether jurisdiction is proper. 315 It explains why the federal courts in Utah
apply the rational nexus test. 316 And it explains why the federal courts in
Michigan look to the Model Choice of Forum Act to determine the
enforceability of an inbound clause. 317 Under the applicable rules, a federal
district court sitting in diversity must look to state law—not federal law—to
determine whether an inbound forum selection clause provides a valid basis
for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. If the
states were to adopt the reforms set forth above as a matter of state law,
therefore, these changes would necessarily alter the jurisdictional reach of
any federal district court sitting in that state.
In a number of cases, however, the federal courts have failed to recognize
this fact. The confusion stems from a failure to recognize the difference
between outbound and inbound forum selection clauses. 318 In Stewart
Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court held—or at least
strongly implied—that the enforceability of an outbound clause in a diversity
action is procedural under Erie and hence governed by federal law. 319 The
Court reasoned that the federal statute relating to change of venue—28 U.S.C.
§ 1404—controlled the issue of whether the court should give effect to an
outbound clause and to transfer the case to another court, and that federal law
preempted state law. 320 When a federal court is called upon to enforce an
inbound clause, however, 28 U.S.C. § 1404 is inapplicable. The defendant is
not invoking the clause in an attempt to transfer the case to another court;
rather, the defendant is arguing that the court named in the clause lacks
personal jurisdiction. In the inbound context, therefore, the holding in Ricoh
314. See Omega IM Grp., LLC v. Louidar, LLC, No. 17-22141-CIV, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26849, at *14 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2018).
315. See GE Oil & Gas, LLC v. Turbine Generation Servs., LLC, No. 18-CV-7555, 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76885, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2019).
316. See Colt Builders Corp. v. Maille, No. 2:18cv861, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27752, at *8–
9 (D. Utah Feb. 20, 2019).
317. See, e.g., FCA US LLC v. Bullock, No. 17-cv-13972, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65692, at
*7 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 19, 2018).
318. For cases where courts relied on outbound cases to hold that enforceability of an inbound
clause is governed by federal law, see Payment All. Int’l, Inc. v. Deaver, No. 17-CV-693, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16516, at *9 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 1, 2018); De Lage Landen Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Rasa
Floors, LP, No. 08-00533, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91427, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2008);
Microseismic, Inc. v. TRAC Charitable Remainder Tr., No. H-12-0118, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
101108, at *20 (S.D. Tex. July 20, 2012); United Rentals (N. Am.), Inc. v. Myers, No. 03cv589,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25274, at *4 (D. Conn. May 22, 2003); ACS Constr. Co. v. Chamberlin
Co., No. 99CV18, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13446, at *6 (N.D. Miss. July 28, 1999).
319. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 28–29 (1988).
320. Id.
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that federal law governs the enforceability of the forum selection clause is
irrelevant. In the absence of any other rule on the subject, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure direct federal courts to state law as developed by the state
courts of general jurisdiction in the state in which they sit to determine
whether the clause provides a valid basis for the assertion of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. 321
CONCLUSION
Historically, courts and commentators have only intermittently drawn a
distinction between inbound and outbound forum selection clauses. At first
blush, this decision seems sensible. Why develop separate analytical
frameworks to analyze the exact same piece of contract language? In this
Article, however, we sought to explain why this approach is misguided. We
did so first by providing a comprehensive descriptive account of state
doctrine and state practice as it relates to inbound clauses. We then drew upon
this descriptive account to demonstrate that many of the problems with the
doctrine of jurisdiction by express consent stem from a tendency on the part
of judges to borrow rules blindly from cases where the enforceability of an
outbound clause was at issue to resolve issues relating to inbound clauses.
We have also sought to untangle the complicated relationship between
consent jurisdiction and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has never squarely
addressed the issue of when a consent-to-jurisdiction clause might violate the
Due Process Clause means that the relationship between these two provisions
has rarely been analyzed in significant detail. We shed useful light on this
relationship and, in so doing, helped to distinguish constitutional arguments
from arguments based on sound policy. It is difficult to read the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to impose meaningful restrictions on
the states with respect to the enforceability of inbound clauses. This does not
mean, however, that states should enforce all such clauses as a matter of
sound policy. It simply means that the states have extraordinary freedom to
develop the law in this area without worrying about whether their actions will
run afoul of the Due Process Clause.
321. See Alexander Proudfoot Co. World Headquarters L.P. v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912, 919
(11th Cir. 1989) (“Because the application of federal judge-made law here would encourage
forum shopping and promote the inequitable administration of the laws, we must apply state law
to decide the issue presented. We now examine the relevant issues of Florida law.”); see also
James P. George, Parallel Litigation, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 769, 938–39 (1999). But see Nw. Nat’l
Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that federal law governs this
issue).
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Finally, we have shown that the current law of jurisdiction by express
consent, at least in its current incarnation, is inequitable. It enables distant
courts to assert personal jurisdiction over weaker contracting parties on the
basis of inbound forum selection clauses. This state of affairs can and must
change. As a matter of policy, the courts should stop enforcing inbound
clauses against unsophisticated actors in contracts of adhesion. They should
also stop enforcing inbound clauses when there is no way for the defendant
to identify the chosen jurisdiction at the time of signing. Finally, they should
stop enforcing inbound clauses when the chosen forum is not in a reasonably
convenient location. Each of these reforms, if enacted, would make the body
of law relating to jurisdiction by express consent in the United States fairer,
more equitable, and more just.
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APPENDIX
ALABAMA
Consumer Lease – Ala. Code § 7-2A-106(2)
ALASKA
Consumer Lease – Alaska Stat. Ann. § 45.12.106(b)
Student Loan Contract – Alaska Stat. Ann. § 14.48.160(a)(2)
ARIZONA
Consumer Lease – Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47-2A106(B)
ARKANSAS
Consumer Lease – Ark. Code Ann. § 4-2A-106(2)
CALIFORNIA
Consumer Lease – Cal. Com. Code § 10106(b)
Low Value Consumer Contracts – Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §
116.225
COLORADO
Consumer Lease – Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4-2.5-106(2)
Consumer Credit – Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 5-1-201(8)(b)
Foreclosure – Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-1106(1)(b)
CONNECTICUT
Consumer Lease – Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42a-2A-106(b)
DELAWARE
Consumer Lease – Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 2A-106(2)
Foreclosure – Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 2424B
FLORIDA
Consumer Lease – Fla. Stat. Ann. § 680.1061(2)
GEORGIA
Consumer Lease – Ga. Code Ann. § 11-2A-106(2)
HAWAII
Consumer Lease – Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 490:2A-106(b)
Consumer Credit – Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 476-30(f)(5)
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IDAHO
Consumer Lease – Idaho Code Ann. § 28-12-106(2)
Consumer Credit – Idaho Code § 28-41-201(8)(b)
ILLINOIS
Consumer Lease – 810 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/2A-106(2)
INDIANA
Consumer Lease – Ind. Code Ann. § 26-1-2.1-106(2)
Consumer Credit – Ind. Code Ann. § 24-4.5-1-201(6)(b)
IOWA
Consumer Lease – Iowa Code Ann. § 554.13106(2)
Consumer Credit – Iowa Code Ann. § 537.1201(6)(a)(5)
Motor Vehicle Franchise – Iowa Code Ann. § 322A.19(2)
KANSAS
Consumer Lease – Kan. Stat. Ann. § 84-2a-106(2)
Consumer Credit – Kan. Stat. Ann. § 16a-1-201(8)(b)
KENTUCKY
Consumer Lease – Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 355.2A-106(2)
LOUISIANA
Lease of Movable Property – La. Stat. Ann. § 9:3303(F)(1)
Consumer Transaction – La. Stat. Ann. § 51:1418(C)
Consumer Credit – La. R.S. § 9:3511(C)(1)
MAINE
Consumer Lease – Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 11, § 2-1106(2)
Consumer Credit – Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 9-A, § 1-201(8)(B)
MARYLAND
Consumer Lease – Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 2A-106(2)
Foreclosure – Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 7-310(b)
MASSACHUSETTS
Consumer Lease – Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 106, § 2A106(2)
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MICHIGAN
Consumer Lease – Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 440.2806(2)
MINNESOTA
Consumer Lease – Minn. Stat. Ann. § 336.2A-106(2)
MISSISSIPPI
Consumer Lease – Miss. Code. Ann. § 75-2A-106(2)
MISSOURI
Consumer Lease – Mo. Ann. Stat. § 400.2A-106(2)
Structured Settlement – Mo. Ann. Stat. § 407.1066(4)
MONTANA
Consumer Lease – Mont. Code Ann. § 30-2A-106(2)
NEBRASKA
Consumer Lease – Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. U.C.C. § 2A-106(2)
Foreclosure – Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 76-2715(2)
Student Loan Contract – Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann § 85-1645(2)
NEVADA
Consumer Lease – Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 104A.2106(2)
Student Loan Contract – Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
394.590(1)(b)
NEW HAMPSHIRE
Consumer Lease – N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 382-A:2A-106(2)
NEW JERSEY
Consumer Lease – N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2A-106(2)
NEW MEXICO
Consumer Lease – N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-2A-106(2)
Foreclosure – N.M. Stat. Ann. § 47-15-5(G)(2)
NEW YORK
Consumer Lease – N.Y. U.C.C. Law § 2-A-106(2)
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NORTH CAROLINA
Consumer Lease – N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 25-2A-106(2)
NORTH DAKOTA
Consumer Lease – N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 41-02.1-06(2)
OHIO
Consumer Lease – Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1310.04(B)
OKLAHOMA
Consumer Lease – Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, § 2A-106(2)
Consumer Credit – Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 14A, § 1-201(9)(b)
Deferred Deposit Lending Agreement – 59 Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. § 3150.12(E)(1)(b)
OREGON
Consumer Lease – Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 72A.1060(2)
Foreclosure – Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 646A.710(2)(b)
PENNSYLVANIA
Consumer Lease – 13 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. §
2A106(b)
RHODE ISLAND
Consumer Lease – 6A R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 6A-2.1-106(2)
SOUTH CAROLINA
Consumer Lease – S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2A-106(2)
Consumer Credit – S.C. Code Ann. § 37-1-201(10)(e)
SOUTH DAKOTA
Consumer Lease – S.D. Codified Laws § 57A-2A-106(2)
TENNESSEE
Consumer Lease – Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2A-106(2)
Deferred Presentment Services Agreement – Tenn. Code
Ann. § 45-17-112(s)(1)(B)
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Student Loan Contract – Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-72015(a)(2)(B)
TEXAS
Consumer Lease – Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §
2A.106(b)
UTAH
Consumer Lease – Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-106(2)
VERMONT
Consumer Lease – Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9A, § 2A-106(2)
Credit Card Terminal Finance Lease – Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9,
§ 2482i(5)(A)
Agricultural Finance Lease – Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 2389(b)
VIRGINIA
Consumer Lease – Va. Code Ann. § 8.2A-106(2)
WASHINGTON
Consumer Lease – Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 62A.2A-106(2)
Student Loan Contract – Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
28B.85.140(2); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 28C.10.170(2)
WEST VIRGINIA
Consumer Lease – W. Va. Code Ann. § 46-2A-106(2)
WISCONSIN
Consumer Lease – Wis. Stat. Ann. § 411.106(2)
Consumer Credit – Wis. Stat. Ann. § 421.201(10)(b)
WYOMING
Consumer Lease – Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34.1-2.A-106(b)
Consumer Credit – Wyo. Stat. § 40-14-120(j)(ii)

